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DID THE PATTERN OF AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT GROWTH CHANGE 
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Running title: 
Changing pattern of aggregate Employment Growth in the euro area 
Abstract 
The paper examines whether the pattern of growth in euro area employment seen in the 
period 1997-2001 differed from that recorded in the past and what could be the reasons for that. 
First, a standard employment equation is estimated for the euro area as a whole. This shows that 
the lagged impact of both output growth and real labour cost growth, together with a 
productivity trend and employment “inertia”, can account for most of the employment 
developments between 1970 and the early 1990s. Conversely, these traditional determinants can 
only explain part of the employment developm nt seen in recent years (1997-2001). Second, the 
paper shows sound evidence of a structural break in the aggregate employment equation in the 
late 1990s. Third, the paper provides some tentative explanations for this change in aggregate 
employment developments, using in particular country panels of institutional variables and of 
active labour market policies but also cross-sectional analyses. Among the relevant factors 
likely to have contributed to rising aggregate employment in recent years are changes in the 
sectoral composition of euro area employment, the strong development of part-time jobs, lower 
labour tax rates and possibly less stringent employment protection legislation and greater 
subsidies to private employment. 
 
JEL Classification numbers: C20, E24, H50, J23. 
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1. Introduction 
Until recently, the emphasis in the economic literature to account for the improvement in 
labour markets in Europe in 1997-2001 was mainly put on the decline in structural 
unemployment. It has been argued that overly rigid institutional structures have prevented the 
necessary adjustment to changes in the economic environment, thereby leading to higher or 
more persistent unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell 1997; Layard and Nickell, 1998; 
Morgan and Mourougane, 2001). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) attribute the rise in 
unemployment in Europe to the interaction of institutions with adverse macroeconomic shocks. 
More recently, several studies have dealt with employment growth directly to shed some 
light on the strong improvement of labour market performance in many European countries in 
the late 1990s. From a descriptive point of view, Duchêne and Jacquot (1999) investigate 
whether a break occurred in the trend growth rate of labour productivity per person employed 
during the first half of the 1990s in the main OECD countries and whether such a break could be 
accounted for by changes in relative factor costs or in the number of hours worked. Some other 
studies have focused on specific aspects to explain the improvement in net employment 
creation, such as wage discipline in Economic and Monetary Union (Pichelmann, 2001) or the 
change in employment composition (ECB, 2002a). Some more comprehensive studies have 
attempted to survey all the changes capable of accounting for the higher job intensity in Europe 
(European Commission, 2000; Decressin et al., 2001; Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002). The 
geographic focus varies across these studies (EU countries, large euro area countries or OECD 
countries). This paper continues in this vein by analysing the determinants of employment for 
the euro area as a whole, while not neglecting heterogeneity across countries. From a 
methodological point of view, the paper follows that of Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001), who 
estimated an aggregate dynamic employment equation for the euro area with an error correction 
mechanism. While Fagan et al. ran their equation up to 1997, this article focuses on the pattern 
of employment in recent years.  
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The employment rate in the euro area, at almost 64% in 2001, was considerably lower than 
in the United States (nearly 75%). The period 1997-2001 however saw a protracted period of 
sustained employment growth, which led to a fall in unemployment despite a strong increase in 
the labour force (Genre and Gómez-Salvador, 2002). Total employment has grown at an 
average year-on-year rate of 1.5% from 1997 to 2001, compared with a decline of 0.2% between 
1990 and 1997. This corresponds to an increase of around 7 million in the number of persons 
employed, whereas earlier in the 1990s, by comparison, employment fell by over 1 million. This 
strong employment growth is also noticeable when compared with the previous period of strong 
growth, registered in the late 1980s. Since the late 1960s, as seen in Table 1, the average growth 
rate recorded in the late 1990s is only comparable to that recorded in the second half of the 
1980s (1.4%). However, the ratio of employment growth to real GDP growth indicates that real 
GDP growth was more job intensive in the recent period, at 0.6, compared with 0.4 in the late 
1980s. Likewise, the ratio of employment growth to real GDP growth became higher in the late 
1990s in the euro area than that in the US and the UK. By contrast, this ratio was lower than in 
the US during past periods of expansion and also lower than that in the UK in the late 1980s.  
What accounts for this development? This paper argues that the traditional determinants 
(GDP growth, labour cost developments, trend productivity) do not fully explain the strong 
employment growth recorded in the euro area in the recent period. Sound econometric evidence, 
based mainly on time-series analysis, but also on panel data analysis, suggests that the recent 
employment performance is related to a structural change in aggregate employment behaviour 
in the euro area. Looking further, in order to explain the factors underlying this change, a panel 
of time-varying institutions and measures of active labour market policies is used. This latter 
methodological approach can be associated with the branch of the literature initiated by 
Scarpetta (1996) and extended by Belot and van Ours (2000) and Nickell et al. (2001). These 
articles used cross-sectional or pooled time series data on indicators of labour market 
performance and labour market institutions to account for unemployment differentials across 
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countries. However, the results found using institutional variables are often unclear or not 
robust, partly due to measurement problems.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a standard employment 
equation, estimated for the euro area as a whole. Section 3 shows the existence of a structural 
break in the aggregated employment equation in the late 1990s. Section 4 provides some 
tentative explanations for this change, using in particular country panels of institutional 
variables and of active labour market policies as well as cross-sectional analysis. 
2. Estimation of a standard employment equation 
2.1 Theoretical framework  
A CES production function with two production factors and constant returns to scale, 
proposed by Arrow et al. (1961), provides a simple and standard analytical framework to 
highlight the effect of the main determinants of labour demand:  
111
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with Y standing for output, L for labour, K for capital, a for labour productivityi, H for the 
labour-intensity of the method of production and  for the elasticity of substitution between 
effective labour (aL) and capital. Then, the first order condition of firm’s profit maximisation 
leads to equate the marginal labour productivity to real compensation per employee w/p. This 
leads to the following expression:





 111 ttt YLap
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We suppose conventionally that labour productivity growth is constant and positive with 
log at =!.t and !>0, reflecting trend technological progress. After rearranging and writing in 
logarithms, we end up with:  
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log Lt = log Yt -  log( w/p) - (1- ) !.t +  log H
The employment level depends on total output, a labour productivity trend and real labour 
costs. The elasticity of substitution is conventionally between zero and unity (imperfect 
substitution between production factors), the elasticity of employment to real labour costs is 
negative and lower than 1 in absolute value and the coefficient of productivity trend is negative 
as well. If the elasticity of substitution is equal to unity, the production function becomes a 
Cobb-Douglas function and labour demand has the following form: log Lt = log Yt - log(w/p) +
log H., with a unit elasticity of real labour costs and no time trend. 
There are a number of other possible equivalent ways to specify the long run condition for 
employment in this framework. For instance, instead of the profit maximisation problem, Fagan 
et al. (2001) used the employment level induced by the inverted (Cobb-Douglas) production 
function, which depends upon real GDP, total capital stock and trend total factor productivity. 
Alternatively, following the cost-minimisation problem subject to a given capital stock, 
employment becomes a function of eal GDP, technical progress and relative factor prices. 
However, the choice of the profit-maximisation approach stems from the fact that real wage 
statistics are more reliable than capital stock data or capital cost data and available on a 
quarterly basis. Moreover, in this specification, employment only depends on output and labour 
market variables (labour costs and trend labour productivity). 
In this setting, real labour cost elasticity gives a measure of the elasticity of substitution J.
In economic terms, this parameter means that a growth of 1% in the relative cost of labour to 
capital will lead to a growth of J% in the ratio of capital to labour. More formally, we have J =
d(K/L)/d(w/r)*r/w*L/K, where r is the cost of capital. The interpretation of the time trend 
should also be discussed. The absolute value of its (negative) coefficient depends negatively on 
the elasticity of substitution J and positively on trend labour productivity, mirroring technology 
developments, assumed to be constant over time. The constant, J.log H, which turns into 
µ.J.log H with µ being the mark-up over costs in the case of imperfect competition (see Morgan, 
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2001), depends positively on the elasticity of substitution J, the labour-intensity of the method 
of production H and the market power of firms µ.  
In this setting, the elasticity of employment to output is unity. Calling into question this 
result would mean to allow for the interaction between the level of labour productivity and the 
level of output. For instance, if we set log at =!.t +( log Y with 0<(<1, the elasticity becomes 
less than unity. Such an interaction is difficult to explain. One could suppose that the level of 
output reflects the level of knowledge in the economy, as argued in some endogenous growth 
models. But no sound evidence has been provided on this. Therefore, in the subsequent section, 
we will assume an elasticity of employment to output equal to unity and use panel data analysis 
to test it. 
2.2 Data used 
The euro area data for th  period 1985-2002 are built from the aggregation of quarterly 
ESA95 National Account series. Before 1985, they have been back-cast using data of the ECB 
area-wide modelii. Employment series refers to total employment (employees plus self-
employed) in terms of persons employed. An alternative could have been to reason in terms of 
hours worked or full-time equivalents. This choice was motivated by two reasons. First, part-
time employment data, needed to compute full-time equivalents, are missing before 1991 on a 
quarterly basis (Eurostat quarterly labour indicator) and are not available on an annual basis 
before 1983 (European Community Labour Force Survey)iii. Second, compared with the number 
of employed persons, the estimates of hours worked are more fragile and the concept itself more 
uncertain (hours effectively worked or hours usually worked in the reference period). The 
number of persons employed is more consistent with the measures of unemployment and the 
labour force. However, tentative estimates based on hours worked and full-time equivalent 
employment will be provided in this paper as a robustness check.  
Labour cost data refer to total compensation per employee deflated by euro area GDP 
deflator at market prices. This series encompasses total labour costs, i.e. direct (wages) and 
indirect (social security contribution) remuneration. However, unlike employment data, 
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compensation per employee covers only employees’ compensation, excluding remunerations of 
the self-employed, which are unavailable. This could slightly bias the estimation of the 
employment equation, because it is implicitly assumed that average compensation received by 
the self-employed has grown at the same pace as compensation per employee. 
 
2.3 Estimation method 
The explanatory variables being non-stationary, we have chosen an error-correction-model 
specification, allowing for distinguishing the short-term dynamics from the long-term 
determinants (corresponding to the cointegration relation). The use of quarterly data starting in 
1970 yields a relatively long time series dimension, allowing for the precise analysis of the 
dynamics, which generally requires data with reasonable frequency and implies a large loss of 
degrees of freedom. Moreover, the relatively long period chosen covers at least three full 
economic cycles, which will help to better distinguish the cyclical behaviour of labour demand 
from possible structural changes.  
From an economic point of view, the use of an error-correction model is justified by the 
existence of costs of adjustment, which induce a slow response to shocks to labour demand (e.g. 
changes in GDP or labour costs), as pointed out by the large literature on dynamic labour 
demand, e.g. Nickell (1986). As explained by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), these adjustment 
costs are of two kinds. First, the net costs are those of changing the numbers of employees in the 
firms, for instance the loss of efficiency due to the internal reorganisation of work. Gross costs 
of adjusting labour demand are those related to the flows of workers entering or leaving the 
firm, such as search and recruitment costs, slow adjustment of capital stock, the cost of training 
and job protection legislation (mandatory notice of layoffs, severance payment, cost of legal 
disputes, etc).  
In order to disentangle the long-term equilibrium relation between variables and the 
dynamics, we will follow the two-step procedure of Engel and Granger (see Hamilton, 1994). 
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We will estimate first the long-run level of labour demand and identify a cointegration 
relationship between variables. Second, an equation in first differences will be estimated to 
capture dynamics. In order to avoid endogeneity, the contemporaneous quarterly change in GDP 
and real labour costs is omitted. An estimate using instrumental variables approach, where the 
contemporaneous change in GDP is instrumented by lagged changes in GDP, confirms that this 
current term is not significant. Conversely, it turns out to be highly significant with a standard 
OLS approach, suggesting that the contemporary correlation between GDP and employment 
growth mainly captures the reverse causality, i.e. the current impact of employment to activity.  
With E, Y and w/p standing respectively for total employment, real GDP and real labour 
costs, euro area labour demand can be modelled by the following equation, where -, ! and ( are 
estimated separately by OLS.  
  
= = =
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However, this labour demand equation is estimated with actual employment data, which by 
definition satisfy the equilibrium condition between labour demand and the labour supply. 
Therefore, labour supply variables may have explained a part of the employment developments. 
Due to lack of data or data limitation, it appears quite difficult to control for labour supply 
variables in a macroeconomic equation. For instance, institutional data, constructed by Nickell 
and Nunziata (2001) and available at the country level, cannot be aggregated at the euro level, 
given the strong methodological differences in the construction of those series across countries. 
Moreover, the low number of observations limits the relevance of using them in a time-series 
approach. Another relevant supply-side dimension, the structure of population by educational 
attainment, cannot be taken into account, because of the lack of a long-time series. However, 
some demographic variables may be used to control for a part of the labour supply effects. The 
working age populationiv appears a natural control variable positively related to employment 
growth, as it represents the potential labour force. Moreover, recent studies, such as Korenman 
and Neumark (2000) or Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002) point to the importance of the 
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10
age structure of the working-age population and in particular of the relative size of the youth 
population to explain aggregate employment and unemployment rates. Young people are most 
affected by labour market institutions which impose some kind of wage floor (like minimum 
wages, collective bargaining, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, etc.), 
which translates into a low youth employment rate compared to that of prime–age people. The 
increase in the relative size of the young population is supposed to decrease employment. Thus, 
an equation controlling for these shifts in the size and structure of the working-age population is 
estimated. However, as shown in equations (1) to (4) in Table 2, the effect of both demographic 
variables turns out to be clearly insignificant. This suggests that, given the lack of specific 
labour-supply-related data, actual employment developments in the euro area seem to be 
captured reasonably well by the standard labour demand equationv. This is highlighted by 
equations (1) and (2) reported in Table 3. 
 
3. Is there any evidence of a structural change in recent years?  
This section presents some evidence pointing to a structural change in the employment 
behaviour in the late 1990s. First, a break is introduced in the euro area employment equation, 
in which the number of person employed measures employment. The role of the break and the 
traditional determinants is carefully assessed. Second, the robustness of the break is tested by 
using other measures of employment (full-time equivalent, hours worked), which permits to 
evaluate the importance of part-time employment developments. Lastly, the question of cross-
country heterogeneity is addressed. 
3.1 Evidence of a break in the standard employment equation for the euro area 
Some evidence points to a possible change in the pattern of euro area employment in recent 
years. Although the overall stability of the equation is not rejected, some instability is visible at 
the end of the period when performing a recursive estimate of the coefficient. This may explain 
why the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) term is not highly significant (see equations 1 and 
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2 in Table 3). Another piece of evidence is the poor performance of the dynamic simulation at 
the end of the period, which clearly overestimates employment in the early 1990s and 
underestimates it in the late 1990s (Figure 1). Dynamic contributions computed on the basis of 
equation 1 in Table 3 and shown in Figure 2 suggest that residuals have substantially 
contributed to employment growth in the period 1997-2001, explaining 0.7 p.p. of total 
employment growth each year on average. This is confirmed by the instability displayed by 
equations (1) and (2) in Table 3 from around 1997, when estimating its coefficients recursively. 
3.1.1 Quality of the dynamic simulation and the forecasting performance when allowing for a 
break 
In order to identify possible changes in employment pattern, we reestimate equation (2) 
(one-step ECM procedures) in Table 3 by allowing for breaks in all variables. Then we 
sequentially remove the least significant break until only statistically significant breaks remain. 
As shown in detail in Table 4, this sequential procedure leads to retaining only one break, in the 
intercept. According to various criteria (adjusted R square, t-value of the break, RMSE of 
recursive out-of-sample forecast), the break appears most relevant when starting in 1997. This is 
in line with the result yielded by the dynamic contribution of the residuals from the traditional 
equation and the recursive estimates of the coefficient. The break still appears highly significant 
and its magnitude is unchanged, when controlling for some observable labour-supply effects 
mentioned earlier (working age population and the relative size of the youth population). This 
emerges when comparing equations (3) and (4) in Table 2 with equation (4) in Table 3.  
The break in intercept can be interpreted as the additional employment growth recorded 
between 1997 and 2001 which cannot be explained by traditional determinants. It corresponds 
to an upward shift in the long term relationship in levels, which translates into a higher but 
temporary employment growth rate until the new long-term level is reached, unlike a break in 
the trend, which would imply a permanent change in the growth rate. According to the 
theoretical model presented earlier in section 2, the increase in the intercept may be interpreted 
either as an increase in the mark-up µ, which seems unlikely given the increase in competition 
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induced by the continuing integration in the Single marketvi, or a rise in the labour-intensity of 
the method of production H.
When including a break, the adjusted R² from the two-step ECM estimation increases from 
0.61 to 0.65 (see equations 1 and 3 in Table 3) and the dynamic simulations derived from either 
one-step or two-step estimation appear to be very close to the actual series and much better than 
that given by equation 1 without a break (see Figure 3). The introduction of the break makes the 
error correction mechanism very significant, which was not the case without a break. Each 
coefficient of the equation appears very stable. The long-term elasticity of real labour costs 
(estimated in one step) is slightly lower than that estimated in one step without the break. The 
strong elasticity of employment to real labour costs in equation 1 could have artificially 
captured the structural changes, which occurred in a period of moderate wage developments 
recorded since 1997. 
Another illustration of the inability of traditional determinants to fully explain employment 
growth in the recent period is provided by the results of the out-of-sample dynamic 
performance. Over 3 million jobs created in the euro area since 1999 are not explained by the 
employment equation estimated between 1970Q1 and 1999Q1 (see Figure 4). In other words, 
0.7 p.p. of the annual employment growth between 1999Q2 and 2002Q2 does not stem from the 
traditional determinants. More formally, the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) of the out-of-
sample forecasts are one third lower when allowing for a break.  
3.1.2 The role of traditional determinants, when allowing for a break  
To illustrate the role of traditional determinants of employment over time, the dynamic 
contributions to employment growthvii are computed from equation (4) with a break (see Table 
3). The results regarding the contribution of GDP or real labour costs are robust, whatever the 
equation considered (1), (2), (3) or (4) and are well reflected in Figure 2. For instance, they are 
not much affected by the inclusion of a break in the equation. Conversely, the reaction lags are 
very sensitive to the specification of the equation and, particularly, to the inclusion of a break. 
Page 14 of 93
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13
The positive employment performance in the euro area in 1997-2001 resulted to a large 
extent from the robust economic growth in the second half of the 1990s (see Figure 2). Over the 
period 1980-2000, employment seems to have been largely driven by GDP growth. For 
instance, the poor employment performance in the early 1990s is clearly related to weak activity 
growth. Employment equations (including all the lags up to five quarters) also allow for 
computing the adjustment lag of employment to GDP over different sub-periods. As shown in 
Table 5, in the period 1970-2002, employment growth is found to react to GDP with a mean lag 
of around eight quarters, when we estimate the equation with all lags. The mean lag seems to 
have decreased in the late 1980s-early 1990s and increased in the recent period. However, when 
we use an alternative equation, retaining the significant lags only, these results are reversed and 
the mean lag of GDP between 1985 and 2002 shortens somewhat down to 6 quarters, which 
leads us to interpret the mean lag with considerable caution. Conversely, the median (50% of 
the long-term effect) reaction lag to GDP seems to have been fairly stable over the past thirty 
years, at around 4.5 quarters. On the whole, reaction lags tend not to signal any noticeable 
change in the adjustment process of employment to GDP.
As shown by Figure 2, the deceleration of real labour cost growth between 1992 and 1996 
set the conditions for dynamic employment growth. By contrast with the late 1980s, real labour 
cost developments remained moderate during the last upturn of 1997-2000, contributing partly 
to the historically strong employment expansion. If real labour cost developments had been the 
same as those recorded in the late 1980s, annual employment growth would have been 0.3-0.4 
percentage point lower than actually seen since mid-1997. Although most of the slowdown in 
employment growth is attributable to the economic downturn, the slight increase in real labour 
costs since mid-2000 seems to have adversely affected employment growth in 2001 and the first 
half of 2002. Likewise, the poor employment performance in the early 1990s, mainly related to 
the slowdown in activity, was worsened by the strong labour cost increase. The slow 
employment growth recorded in the late 1970s despite buoyant economic growth was also likely 
linked to the substantial increase in real labour costs seen in this period. The various economic 
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equations estimated here suggest that the mean lag of employment to real labour cost 
developments between 1985 and early 2002 was around 5 quarters and the median lag between 
3 and 5 quarters (see Table 6). Moreover, it seems that the mean and median reaction lags of 
employment to labour cost have not changed significantly since 1997. 
 
3.2 Robustness of the break while considering hours worked or employment in full-time 
equivalents  
Evidence of a structural break in employment behaviour suggests that employment 
developments could also have been affected by labour market reforms or structural changes (in 
addition to the indirect effect passing through labour cost moderation, such as the social security 
contribution cuts). A natural candidate to explain the lower trend productivity in the late 1990s 
is the rising share of part-time in total employment, meaning that an increasing proportion of 
those employed is working less. This development has caused a reduction of hours worked per 
person of 0.25 p.p. per year on average between 1997 and 2001, according to Labour Force 
Survey data. As this effect combined with possible measurement effectsviii may explain around 
0.3 p.p. out of 0.7 p.p. unexplained by traditional determinantsix, other structural changes or 
labour market reforms should have played a role in explaining the remaining 0.4 p.p. in the 
change in employment behaviour. Moreover, the timing of part-time employment developments 
indicates that they are unlikely to account for a break in employment in the late 1990s. Indeed, 
the positive contribution of part-time jobs to total employment growth declined from the late 
1990s, as shown by the reduced difference between employment growth measured in number of 
persons and in full-time equivalents (see Figure 5). The difference between employment growth 
measured in number of persons and in full-time equivalents, which was around 0.4 p.p. on 
average between 1991 and 1998, fell to around 0.1 p.p. between 1999 and 2001x. Looking 
further back, part-time employment developments and their contribution to total employment 
growth were broadly similar to those recorded in the late 1980s, when economic growth was 
much less job-intensive.  
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To underpin this result, the equation with break (equation 3 in Table 3) is re-estimated with 
employment in terms of full-time equivalents (see Table 7). While the error correction 
mechanism appears much less significant, the break in intercept is still significant at 5%. The 
break is of a lower magnitude than in the equation estimated with employment in terms of 
persons: around 0.3 p.p. annual employment growth in full-time equivalents has not been 
explained by traditional determinants between 1997 and 2001. Of course, this lower part of 
unexplained employment growth after 1997 reflects the effect of part-time on recent 
employment growth. This result is broadly consistent with those found by Garibaldi and Mauro 
(2002): increases in part-time employment in the services sector, where most part-time jobs 
were created, have been associated with increases in the overall number of jobs but most likely 
also with partial crowding out of full-time jobs.  
The use of full-time equivalents improves the measure of “effective” labour but does not 
take into account developments in usual hours worked by full-time workers as well as changes 
in the number of working days. Thus, the equation with break has also been re-estimated with 
employment in terms of total hours worked (see Table 7). The series was built by Korteweg and 
Vijselaar (2002), using OECD data on total hours worked in the economy, completed by Labour 
Force Surveys data on usual weekly working hours. A positive break from 1997 onwards is 
significant at the 1% level and corresponds to a 0.4 p.p. unexplained annual growth in hours 
worked in the period 1997-2001. This latter result should be taken with caution, given the 
fragility of working time measurements, but confirms the break in employment behaviour at the 
end of the period.  
 
3.3 Taking account of heterogeneity across countries 
In order to infer that employment behaviour has changed in recent years, it is necessary to 
check if the break for the euro area as a whole is broadly based across countries or if this only 
reflects specific features in a very limited number of countries. In addition, the findings 
presented for the euro area as a whole might be slightly affected by an aggregation bias, due for 
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instance to changes in country weights over time. For this purpose, fixed-effects regressions are 
run with a macro-panel of 21 OECD countries. A break in employment equation, modelled as a 
dummy for the period 1997-2001, is tested for the EU countries and euro area countries (see 
Table 8). As shown in columns 1 and 2, the break for these two groups of countries appears 
fairly low and insignificant. The break for countries outside the euro area and the EU turns out 
to be negative and clearly insignificant. 
As shown in Table 9, regressions allowing for a break for each euro area country seem to 
indicate that a group of countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) 
have recorded a stronger employment growth that is not fully explained by classical 
determinants. Indeed, the break in these countries appears significant in all regressions (except 
for Ireland). It should also be noted that the significance of the break is not strongly affected by 
the choice of its starting date. Although its exact dating is somehow arbitrary, we make the 
break start from 1997 onwards in order to be consistent with results for the euro area shown in 
section 3.1. This choice is broadly supported by country-by-country estimatesxi. The break turns 
out to be particularly significant for Spain and France. Additional growth recorded in these 
countries since 1997 varies from 0.9 percentage point in Belgium to 3.6 percentage points in 
Spain. Conversely, the second group of countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece and 
Portugal) has not experienced any clear change in their employment pattern. In other words, in 
these countries, employment growth was mostly explained by the traditional determinants in the 
recent years. For most OECD countries outside the euro area, the break is insignificant, with the 
exception of Japan, where it is negative. The regression in column 4 of Table 8 summarises 
these results by testing the break globally for both groups. In the first group, accounting for 
around 59% of the total euro area employment, more than 0.7 p.p. employment growth has not 
been explained by traditional determinants since 1997, this break being statistically significant. 
The break is negative but clearly insignificant in the second group of countriesxii. These results 
confirm that most euro area countries have experienced positive structural changes but not all of 
them.
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4. What factors may account for a change in aggregate employment pattern in 
recent years? 
This section enters a very difficult area, trying to explain the change in employment 
pattern, shown empirically in the previous section. Three aspects are investigated in this section: 
changes in the sectoral composition of the euro area employment, developments in labour 
market institutions and the impact of active labour market policies. 
 
4.1 Changes in the sectoral composition of euro area employment 
Compositional effect may have played a part in explaining development in aggregate 
employment growth, as sugg sted by Marimon and Zilibotti (1998). A simple accounting 
exercise indicates that the average annual growth rate of employment between 1997-2001 would 
have been around 0.2 percentage point lower if the sectoral composition of employment had 
remained the same as in 1986-1991 (see Table 10). Indeed, the share of sectors with high 
employment growth (i.e. market-related services, such as trade, repairs and financial and 
business services) was much higher at the start of the economic expansion of the late 1990s than 
at the beginning of the boom of the late 1980s. Those sectors are characterised by a strong 
economic growth, high employment intensity or both. The strong employment growth in 
market-related services is broadly attributable to a very strong value-added growth. Job intensity 
of growth, measured by the ratio of employment to value-added growth, appears to have been 
very high (1.4) in financial, real estate renting and business services in 1997-2001, while it was 
higher in trade, repairs, hotels and restaurant, transport and communication than in industry 
excluding construction.
Symmetrically, sectors with low or negative employment growth (such as agriculture and 
industry excluding construction) had a lower weight in total employment in the late 1990s than 
in the previous decade. Given that, as a first approximation, total employment growth can be 
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computed as the sum of sectors’ employment growth weighted by the share of each sector in 
total employment, the movements in the sectors’ share might affect total growth even though 
there is no change in sectoral growth. Another way to consider the compositional effect is to 
notice that employment growth in all sectors (except agriculture) was lower in the period 1996-
2001 than in 1986-1991, while aggregate employment growth was broadly similar, as seen in 
Table 10. 
 
4.2 The importance of labour market institutions  
It was found earlier that part-time development contributed to higher employment growth 
in the 1990s but cannot fully explain the break in the late 1990s. The evidence of the effect of 
structural reforms on macroeconomic labour market variables appears patchy in the literature, 
mainly due to the difficulty to quantify and study labour market reforms at a macro-level. 
Moreover, most of the labour market institution data used in this section are not available for the 
late 1990s. Thus, the goal of this section will remain modest, attempting to collect first 
quantitative evidence by introducing labour market variables in employment equations. While 
past studies mainly focused on unemployment, this section emphasises the effect of labour 
market institutions on net employment creation.  
Table 11 shows the panel data estimates of employment models when including annual 
data on labour market institutions as collected from various sources by the OECD and Nickell 
and Nunziata (2001)xiii. Two sets of institutions should be distinguished: those influencing both 
labour demand and labour supply (job protection legislationxiv, total taxes on labour, 
unionisationxv and wage bargaining co-ordination) and those mostly affecting labour supply 
(benefit replacement rates and benefit durations). Various estimations have been carried out. 
Regression (1) uses the first group of institutions, while regressions (2) to (8) also integrated the 
second group of institutions. Following the approach of Belot and van Ours (2000), interactions 
between institutions are taken into account in regressions (4) and (6). Such interactions are used 
as a robustness check and take into account the fact that similar reforms could have different 
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effects in different countries and comprehensive reforms are more effective than piecemeal 
labour market policyxvi.
The equations estimated follow two slightly different specifications. Equations (1) to (4) 
correspond to the traditional employment equation, estimated in section 2 for the euro area as a 
whole. They use total employment (in logarithm) as the dependent variable and include also the 
GDP level and real labour costs. Thus, the following general specification is estimated, where E
denotes employment (either in log or in rate), Y real GDP and w/p real labour costs 
(compensation per employee deflated by the GDP deflator), the i and t are country- and time- 
indices and k kinds of institutions Xk are taken into account and interact with each other: 
Equations (5) and (6) refer to the specification used by Nickell et al. (2001), in which the 
dependent variable is the employment rate (i.e. the ratio of total employment to population aged 
15-64) and GDP and real labour costs are replaced by country trends.  
All the equations are estimated over a sample of euro area countries, as the test for 
poolability suggests that the effect of explanatory variables is very different between euro area 
countries and the other OECD countries. Indeed, a Chow test strongly rejects the hypothesis of 
common slopes across these two groups. A possible and tentative explanation may be that the 
effect of institutions is stronger in countries facing significant rigidities in their labour market, 
which seems to be the case for most euro area countries. Therefore, the equations shown in 
Table 11 are estimated on a panel of euro area countries only. However, the results in terms of 
sign and significance are not very different when including other OECD countries in the sample. 
Moreover, as shown by Nunziata for the institutions (2001), there is clear evidence of non 
stationarity for many of the variables used in the equations. We therefore need to test for 
cointegration so as to check the absence of spurious regressions. The Madala-Wu test consists in 
testing for unit roots in the residuals of the equationsxvii. The test clearly rejected the hypothesis 
of  residuals having a unit root. 
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Several findings should be emphasised. First, the total labour tax ratesxviii (called also tax 
wedge, i.e. employees' and employers' social security contributions and personal income tax as 
percentage of total labour costs) appears to be significant in all equations. Its coefficient is 
always negative and relatively stable, at around -0.15. Given the autoregressive term, this means 
that, other things being equal, a decline of 10 percentage points in the total labour tax rate would 
lead in the long run to a rise of around 11% in the level of employment (models 1 to 3) or to 7 
percentage point increase in the employment rate (model 5), which represents a fairly strong 
effect. Moreover, total labour taxes have an additional adverse effect when combined with a 
high union density.  
Second, evidence appears mixed for employment protection legislation (EPL). It is found 
to be negatively correlated to employment in all equations without interactions. However, it 
only appears significant in models (1) to (3). When adding interaction between institutions, the 
effect of employment protection legislation on its own becomes negative. Nonetheless, it has a 
negative impact on employment when combined with the level of bargaining co-ordination 
(model 4) or unemployment benefit duration (model 6). The latter institutions are likely to raise 
the bargaining power of insiders and then the equilibrium wage, which lowers effective labour 
supply by reducing the prospect of the “outsiders” of being hired. EPL may exacerbate this 
phenomenon of labour supply segmentation by limiting further the ability of outsiders to 
compete with insiders. 
Third, the level of bargaining coordination is found to be positively correlated with 
employment. While it appears strongly significant (at a level of 1%) in models (4) and (6), it is 
not significant in the other equations. Model (3) permits to reject the hypothesis of the 
convexityxix in the effect of bargaining coordination, as modelled by the square of bargaining 
co-ordination variable. This is supported by the economic literature (e.g. Nickell et al., 2001), 
which found that highly co-ordinated bargaining offset the adverse effects of unionisation on 
employment. 
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Fourth, apart from some interactions with the tax wedge or EPL, unionisation, the 
unemployment benefits replacement ratio and unemployment benefit duration are found not 
significant in general (or displaying an unexpected sign in equation 6). Although the 
unemployment benefits replacement ratio seems to adversely affect the employment rate, it has 
no impact on total employment and the effect is not robust to the introduction of interactions.  
Five, equations (4) and (6) confirm that institutions play a role, not only in isolation but 
also interacting between each other. However, the significance of these interactions does not 
appear robust to the specification chosen (logarithm of total employment versus employment 
rate), except for the joint negative effect of total labour taxes and unionisation. 
The interpretation of the findings requires much caution, as some results are not robust 
across the various models estimated. Indeed, the small number of time varying observations for 
institutions as well as high collinearity among institutional variables does not permit to identify 
precisely the impact of individual institutions. Moreover, the role of some institutional variables 
such as taxation and employment protection in determining employment has extensively been 
discussed in both the theoretical and empirical literature and appears not to be clear cut. 
However, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) show that higher taxes lead to higher unemployment and 
lower output growth. An increase in labour taxation is likely to raise total labour costs, leading 
to lower employment growth. The econometric results shown in Table 11 go in this direction. In 
some countries, labour tax rates are unevenly distributed among wage earners, being particularly 
high for low wage earners, youth or low-skilled workers, therefore reducing further their 
employability. Hiring the low skilled is all the more costly for employers as employment 
protection limits the possibility of firing workers who turn out to display low productivity.  
The impact of employment protection legislation on employment appears ambiguous. 
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) argue that both job creation and destruction will decrease as a 
result of an increase in labour adjustment costs but the resulting effect on total employment in 
the long run is uncertain. Bertola (1992) suggests also that individual sectors may be affected 
differently by job protection, which complicates the analysis at the aggregate level. However, 
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Caballero and Hammour (1998) have highlighted that a rise in firing costs may lead firms to 
substitute capital for labour in the medium run, resulting in a lower job intensity of economic 
growth. Empirically, the evidence is mixed. Using cross-sectional data, Nickell (1997) and 
Nickell et al. (2001) do not find a significant effect of employment protection legislation on 
unemployment rates and employment rates across countries, whereas Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000) argue that higher employment protection leads to a larger effect of adverse 
macroeconomic shocks on unemployment. Exploiting time-series dimension of the data, Lazear 
(1990) and Scarpetta (1996) show a positive relationship between firing costs and 
unemployment, while Morgan (2001) finds that employment security slows the dynamic 
adjustment of employment but does not increase the number of persons employed.  
 
4.3 The role of active labour market policies 
In addition to the institutions mentioned above, active labour market policies (ALMP) may 
have played a role in explaining the good employment performance in the late 1990s. Table 12 
presents panel data estimates using OECD data (database on labour market programmes). In 
order to take into account that active labour market measures are likely to impact employment 
growth gradually and to correct for endogeneity problemsxx, ALMP are computed as the share 
of ALMP expenditures in GDP lagged by two years. The results are based on a euro area panel, 
but for most models they are found broadly similar between euro area countries and other 
OECD countries, according to a Chow test on common slopes.  
The findings are mixed in the sense that none of the ALMP expenditures appears 
statistically very significant. However, it should also be noted that coefficient signs are 
consistent across models (1), (2), (3) and (4), except for public employment training. Model (1) 
shows that expenditures devoted to public employment services, labour market training and 
subsidised employment are not significant (at a 5% level). In model (2), subsidies to 
employment have been broken down into subsidies to regular employment in the private sector 
and direct job creation in the public sector. The former, which comes down to lowering taxation 
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rates and reducing labour costs, is positively correlated with employment growth, although not 
statistically significant. Direct job creation in the public or non-profit sector does not seem to 
affect future employment growth with a very low coefficient and t-statistic. In a recent study, 
Algan et al. (2002) argue that job creation in the public sector crowds out private sector 
employment and can even eventually lead to a decline in total employment. The attraction for 
public activities (positively depending on the size of rent in the public sector and the degree of 
substitutability of public and private jobs) exerts upward wage pressure in the private sector, 
reducing employment in this sector. Moreover, direct job creation might contribute to increase 
taxes, which have distorting effects on economic activity. In model (3), expenditures for youth 
have been included but are not significant at all. Their sign is not the one expected. Model (4) is 
a re-estimation of model (2) using the employment rate instead of the natural logarithm of total 
employment. Subsidies to regular employment in the private sector turn out to be significant at 
10% level, while the t-statistic for direct job creation is close to zero.  
All in all, the results based on aggregate data are not very robust and display a low level of 
statistical significance. Scarpetta (1996) confirms that some ALMP, such as job assistance, 
training programs and financial assistance for firm creation can stimulate employment. 
Nevertheless, Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) emphasise that the composition of spending 
is as important as the level. Moreover, as pointed out by Decressin et al (2001), ALMP tend to 
be ineffective when they are not focused on well-defined beneficiaries. For example, broadly 
based employment subsidies may have little effect relative to the level of expenditures because 
of dead-weight losses or substitution effects detrimental to non-subsidised employment. Using 
country evidence, Decressin et al. (2001) conclude that the increased employment intensity of 
growth is unlikely to have primarily been caused by ALMP. However, the increase in subsidies 
to regular employment in the euro area private sector, which doubled as a percentage of GDP 
from 1994 to 2000, might have contributed to the positive employment performance. This 
argument is close to that stated earlier about the reduction in labour taxes in the euro area. 
Employment in public administration increased relatively slowly in the late 1990s compared 
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with that in other sectors, which may also have supported employment creation in the private 
sector (see Algan et al., 2002). 
 
4.4 The role of structural changes in explaining cross-country differences in recent 
employment performance 
The role of structural changes may be highlighted further by relating the cross-country 
differences observed in the employment pattern since 1997 to changes recorded in the sectoral 
composition of employment, institutions and active labour market policies in the second half of 
the 1990s. As mentioned earlier in section 3.3, some countries (Austria, Germany, Greece, 
Finland and Portugal) do not seem to have experienced any significant change in their aggregate 
employment pattern, while the others benefit from higher than expected employment in the 
recent period.  
Looking at the observed cross-country differences and as shown by Figures 6a, 6b and 6c, 
a clear negative relationship emerges between labour tax rates and the presence of a positive 
break in recent employment performance, confirming the panel results presented in section 4.2. 
In particular, countries with higher than expected employment in the late 1990s experienced a 
decline (Ireland, Netherlands, Spain) or at least no movement in their labour tax rate (Belgium 
and France), while most of the countries which saw no significant change in their employment 
growth in the late 1990s faced an increase in their tax wedge. One should also notice that the 
countries experiencing a rise in the tax wedge did not face lower than expected employment 
owing perhaps to an offsetting effect of the concomitant loosening in their employment 
protection legislation. Looking deeper into tax reforms, while there have been across-the-board 
tax-cutting measures in most euro area countries in recent years, some particular attention has 
been paid to reducing tax pressure at the lower end and in the middle of the income distribution 
(see also ECB 2002b). The strong decline in tax rates on low-wage earners recorded in the late 
1990s (by 3 p.p.), which was mainly related to cuts in employers’ social security contribution, is 
indeed a natural candidate to account for the strong employment performance in this period.  
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Although the other variables are less tightly linked to the presence of a positive break in 
employment pattern, some interesting results have been found. The cross-country analysis 
confirms that the impact of changes in the sectoral composition of employment is positively 
correlated to employment performance, but to a much lesser extent than tax wedge. In 
particular, it may have contributed to explaining the break in employment seen in particular in 
France, Italy, Ireland and Spain (see Figure 6a). The strong decline in employment protection 
legislation in Belgium, Italy and Spain may also partly explain the good employment 
performance recorded in these countries. In line with the results found in section 4.3, Table 6c
suggests that subsidies to regular employment in the private sector may also have helped in 
improving employment performance in the late 1990s in Belgium, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands. Conversely, Austria, Germany, Greece and Portugal may have suffered from a 
decline in the rate of subsidies to private sector employment. Lastly, Belgium, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and, to a lower extent, Italy may have benefited from the strong rise in the part-time 
employment rate, whereas Greece and Finland suffered from relatively weak developments in 
part-time employment. However, the role of part-time job developments in accounting for cross-
country differences in employment performance does not appear predominant as Germany, and 
to a lesser extent Portugal and Austria, also experienced a significant rise in the part-time 
employment rate.  
Conversely, other institution such as the share of temporary jobs, union density, benefit 
replacement rate, benefit duration or most ALMP (public employment services, labour market 
training and direct job creation in the public sector) do not display any evident clear link with 
the employment performance in euro area countries in the late 1990s. This is again broadly in 
line with panel data findings reported earlier. However and more tentatively, it is plausible that 
Germany and Portugal may have suffered from the strong concomitant increase in the 
replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefit. At the other extreme, Spain which 
experienced the strongest break in the employment performance may have taken advantage of 
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the decline in benefit replacement rate and union density in addition to that in employment 
protection legislation and tax wedges. 
 
To summarise, tentative evidence seems to point to the positive impact of structural 
changes on employment creation. However, the timing of the structural break (from 1997-1998 
onwards according to panel data and time series estimates) is important. The IMF (1999) argues 
that it is not a coincidence that positive effects of structural reforms appear in economic upturns, 
even though the reforms were implemented earlier. This argument is similar to that developed 
by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), according to whom a labour market outcome results from the 
interaction of both macroeconomic shocks and institutions. The increase in “potential 
employment”, induced by structural changes and reflected by higher job intensity, will raise 
potential output, which will require a corresponding increase in effective demand so that 
reforms could translate into effective increases in output and employment. Furthermore, 
following a rationale close to Rowthorn’s (1999), an increase in capital stock, which is mainly 
driven by the cycle, may also be required for the positive effects of structural reforms to actually 
lead to create new jobs. An alternative (and not mutually exclusive) explanation for the timing 
of the impact of labour market reforms may be that many of them have been taken in the mid-
1990s and may have materialised gradually over the late 1990s (see ECB 2002a). 
 
Conclusion 
The present paper aims to better understand the recent employment growth in the euro area. 
Econometric estimations of labour demand show that employment growth inertia coupled with a 
productivity trend and the lagged impact of both economic growth and real labour costs can 
largely explain employment developments between 1970 and the mid-1990s. Moreover, 
relatively low increases in real labour costs in the late 1990s compared to the 1980s certainly 
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contributed to the good employment performance recorded in recent years. However, 
employment equations estimated for the period 1970-1996 explain only partly the strong 
employment growth observed between 1997 and 2001. The inclusion of a break from 1997 
onwards improves substantially the fit of the dynamic simulation. The significance of the break 
seems robust, whatever the measure of employment used (employment per head, full-time 
equivalents or hours worked). Moreover, most euro area countries (but not all) appear to have 
experienced a break in the late 1990s.  
Compositional effects, linked to the higher share of fast growing and job-intensive sectors 
such as market related services in total employment in the late 1990s, is likely to have slightly 
raised aggregate employment growth in recent years. Albeit difficult to show clearly, the break 
in employment would also suggest that labour market reforms and/or structural changes might 
have played a role in the good employment performance in the euro areaxxi. The strong 
development of part-time jobs in the 1990s should have played a positive part and lower labour 
tax rates should have contributed to the good employment performance since 1997 in the euro 
area. More tentatively, the relaxation of job protection legislation may have facilitated 
employment creation in the late 1990s. Furthermore, some active labour market policies, such as 
subsidies to private employment, might also have played a positive role, although the results do 
not appear very significant or robust. Conversely, most ALMP are found clearly insignificant in 
explaining employment developments. It should be borne in mind that data limitations, 
particularly for labour market institutions (poor time series dimension and unavailability of very 
recent data) and active labour market policies (highly aggregated data), as well as the lack of 
robustness of some results call for considerable caution in explaining the break in employment. 
The results presented in the last section on the impact of institutions and active labour market 
policies illustrate the difficulty of highlighting the effect of structural reforms at a 
macroeconomic level, as confirmed by numerous studies. 
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Table 1 
Employment, activity and job intensity during economic expansions  
(Average annual change %, unless otherwise indicated) 
 Period of economic expansion 
Euro area 1969-1973 1976-1980 1986-1990 1997-2000
total employment 0.8 0.4 1.4 1.6 
GDP 5.3 3.3 3.3 2.8 
ratio employment growth / GDP 
growth
0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 
United Kingdom  
total employment 0.3 0.1 1.9 1.4 
GDP 2.6 1.8 3.3 2.9 
ratio employment growth / GDP 
growth
0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 
US  
total employment 1.6 3.0 2.1 1.6 
GDP 2.9 3.7 3.2 4.2 
ratio employment growth / GDP 
growth
0.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 
Sources: European Commission, Eurostat, OECD and author’s calculations. 
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Table 2 
OLS Estimates of employment equations, controlling for some labour supply effects (age structure 
and working age population).  
 Equation (1) 
without break  
(one step-
estimation)(1) 
Equation (2) 
Without break  
(one step-
estimation)(1) 
Equation (3) 
without break  
(one step-
estimation)(1) 
Equation (4) 
without break  
(one step-
estimation)(1) 
Estimation period 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics)
V lnEt-1 0.39 
(4.1)
0.41 
(2.5)
0.32 
(3.3)
0.30 
(3.1)
V lnYt-1 0.06 
(1.84)
0.07 
(1.9)
0.06 
(1.8)
0.06 
(2.0)
V ln Y t-2 0.06 
(1.59)
0.07 
(1.7)
0.06 
(1.6)
0.06 
(1.8)
V ln (w/p) t-5 -0.047 
(-1.24)
-0.038 
(-0.9)
-0.028 
(-0.76)
-0.020 
(-0.56)Error correction mechanism 
 -0.0456 (-1.82)
-0.030 
(-2.5)
-0.062 
(-2.4)
-0.061 
(-2.6)ln (w/p) t-1 
(long-term relationship) -0.021 (-1.8)
-0.017 
(-2.8)
-0.027 
(-2.1)
-0.026 
(-2.4)Time trend t-1 
 (long-term relationship) -0.0000 (-1.48)
0.0000 
(1.5)
-0.0002 
(-3.17)
-0.0002 
(-2.0)Intercept 
(long-term relationship) 
ln (Working age population) (2) 
(long-term relationship) -0.021 (-1.036)
0.014 
(0.67)ln (age structures) (3)  
(long-term relationship) 0.00062 (0.17)
0.0053 
(1.59)
Dummy 1975Q2 -0.0035 
(3.2)
-0.0035 
(-2.6)
-0.003 
(-3.1)
-0.003 
(-2.8)
Dummy 1984Q1 -0.0052 
(-9.1)
-0.0056 
(-8.7)
-0.005 
(-9.4)
-0.005 
(-10.9)
Dummy 1992Q3 -0.00426 
(-7.2)
-0.0044 
(-7.3)
-0.004 
(-7.8)
-0.004 
(-8.1)
Intercept 0.096 
(0.47)
2.1 
(3.2)
-0.36 
(-1.7)
0.22 
(-2.9)
Break  (1997Q1-2002Q2)   0.0026 
(4.7)
0.0027 
(4.8)
Main statistics     
R2 0.652 0.656 0.681 0.687 
Adjusted R2 0.618 0.622 0.648 0.653 
Durbin Watson 2.05 2.03 2.0 1.99 
(1) As some heteroskedasticity has been detected., the t-statistics presented in this column are computed with the White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
(2) The working-age population is defined as those aged 15-64 (OECD usual definition). 
(3) The relative size of youth/prime age population, defined as the size of population aged 15-24 over the population aged 25-54. 
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Table 3 
OLS Estimates of employment equations with and without break 
 Equation (1) 
without break  
(two step-
estimation) 
Equation (2) 
Without break (1) 
(one step-
estimation) (1) 
Equation (3) 
With break (1) 
(two step-
estimation) (1) 
Equation (4) 
with break (1) 
(one step-
estimation) (1) 
Estimation period 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics)
V lnEt-1 0.498 
(7.11)
0.409 
(4.74)
0.319 
(4.69)
0.319 
(3.34)
V lnYt-1 0.0561 
(1.81)
0.069 
(2.08)
0.055 
(2.08)
0.057 
(1.71)
V ln Y t-2 0.0476 
(1.48)
0.068 
(1.90)
0.055 
(1.898)
0.053 
(1.54)
V ln (w/p) t-5 -0.0636 
(-2.55)
-0.99 
(-1.90)
-0.0392 
(-1.22)
-0.033 
(-0.88)
Error correction mechanism -0.027 
(-1.40)
-0.031 
(-1.67)
-0.065 
(-2.93)
-0.067 
(-2.91)ln (w/p) t-1 
(long-term relationship) -0.448 -0.550 (-1.59)
-0.448 -0.407 
(-2.3)Time trend t-1 
 (long-term relationship) -0.003 -0.0022 (-1.30)
-0.003 -0.00212 
(-2.95)Intercept 
(long-term relationship) -3.30 -3.30 
Dummy 1975Q2 -0.0042 
(-2.24)
-0.0033 
(-2.9)
-0.0036 
(-4.73)
-0.0034 
(-3.2)
Dummy 1984Q1 -0.0061 
(-3.42)
-0.0056 
(-12.8)
-0.0052 
(-13.21)
-0.0053 
(-12.0)
Dummy 1992Q3 -0.004 
(-2.08)
-0.004 
(-7.64)
-0.004 
(-8.63)
-0.0041 
(-7.6)
Intercept 0.0005 
(1.15)
-0.113 
(-1.69)
0.0004 
(1.21)
-0.21 
(-2.72)
Break  (1997Q1-2002Q2)   0.0021 
(4.53)
0.0021 
(3.78)
Main statistics     
R2 0.632 0.654 0.680 0.681 
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.621 0.654 0.649 
Diagnostic tests     
Durbin Watson 2.13 2.05 1.99 1.99 
LM (1) 0.16 
(0.20)
0.61 
(0.43)
0.02 
(0.88)
0.016 
(0.90)
LM (4) 7.79 
(0.10)
7.13 
(0.13)
2.77 
(0.60)
2.82 
(0.59)
ARCH(1) 0.38 
(0.54)
1.54 
(0.21)
3.10 
(0.08)
3.22 
(0.07)
WHITE 17.14 
(0.19)
37.46 
(0.003)
25.6 
(0.03)
39.3 
(0.003)
Normality 3.88 
(0.14)
0.63 
(0.73)
0.77 
(0.68)
0.76 
(0.68)
RESET(1) 5.74 
(0.02)
7.76 
(0.005)
3.32 
(0.07)
3.00 
(0.09)
CHOW(3) 14.57 
(0. 48)
8.70 
(0.894)
5.14 
(0.99)
5.46 
(0.99)
(1) As some heteroskedasticity has been detected., the t-statistics presented in this column are computed with the White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
(2) Asymptotic tests are presented. 
(3) Predictive failure test over the period 1999Q1-2002Q2. 
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Figure 1 
Total employment: dynamic simulation without break 
observed versus fitted  
 
level in thds 
 
Figure 2 
Dynamic contributions to the annual growth rate of total employment 
(from equation 1 in Table 3, without break) 
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Table 4 
Sequential selection of different possible breaks (from 1997 onwards) in the standard employment 
equation 
Breaks in the equation The least significant break 
(removed in the following steps)
P-value of t-
statistics 
Adjusted R-
squared 
Step 1 
(allowing for breaks 
in all variables) 
VlnEt-1 VlnYt-1  VlnYt-2 Vln(w/p)t-5 
ECM ln(w/p)t-1  TIME-TREND  
INTERCEPT 
VlnEt-1 0.76 0.636 
Step 2 VlnYt-1  VlnYt-2 Vln(w/p)t-5 ECM 
lnw/pt-5  ln(w/p)t-1  TIME-TREND  
INTERCEPT 
Ln(w/p)t-1 0.68 0.639 
Step 3 VlnYt-1  VlnYt-2 Vln(w/p)t-5 ECM 
TIME-TREND  INTERCEPT 
ECM 
(lnEt-1-lnYt-1)
0.76 0.636 
Step 4 VlnYt-1  VlnYt-2 Vln(w/p)t-5 
TIME-TREND  INTERCEPT 
TIME-TREND 0.13 0.646 
Step 5 VlnYt-1  VlnYt-2 Vln(w/p)t-5 
INTERCEPT 
Vln(w/p)t-5 0.18 0.645 
Step 6 VlnYt-1  VlnYt-2  INTERCEPT VlnYt-2 0.07 0.647 
Step 7 VlnYt-1  INTERCEPT VlnYt-1 0.31 0.647 
Final step INTERCEPT INTERCEPT 0.002 0.649 
Note: This table is based on the re-estimation of equation 1 of Table 3, but using a one-step ECM estimation 
procedures and allowing for breaks in all variables (Step 1). The least significant break is removed sequentially in 
the following steps. The results are obtained with OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for possible 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West method). 
Figure 3 
Dynamic simulation with a break since 1997 
observed versus fitted ; level in thds  
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Figure 4 
Forecasting performance between 1999Q2 and 2002Q2 
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Table 5 
Lagged reaction of employment to GDP growth (in quarters) 
period of estimation 1970Q1 - 1996Q4 1970Q1 – 2002Q2 1985Q1 – 1996Q4 1985Q1 – 2002Q2 
50%* lag  4.6 (4.3) 5.0 (4.6) 4.0 (6.9) 4.4 (4.9) 
80%* lag 12.0 (11.3) 11.3 (10.9) 6.9 (13.5) 10.3 (7.4) 
mean lag  7.8 (7.4) 7.5 (8.1) 5.9   (8.8) 8.6  (5.6) 
Note: lagged reactions given by an equation including all lags of endogenous and exogenous variables up to 5 quarters, even 
those non- significant. Between brackets, lagged reactions given by an equation including the significant lags only (see 
equation 1 in Table 3). 
 * Number of quarters needed to reach 50% (80%) of the long-term effect. 
 
Table 6 
Mean lag of employment to real labour costs (in quarters) 
period of estimation  1970Q1 1996Q4 1970Q1 2002Q2 1985Q1 1996Q4  1985Q1 2002Q2 
50%* lag  4.9  (4.8) 5.1 (5.3) ** (**) 3.6 (4.9) 
80%* lag 10.2  (10.1) 8.9 (12.7) ** (**) 5.7 (7.4) 
mean lag  7.7 (7.3) 7.2 (8.6) ** (**) 5.0 (5.2) 
Note: lagged reactions given by an equation including all lags of endogenous and exogenous variables up to 5 quarters, even 
those non- significant. Between brackets, lagged reactions given by an equation including the significant lag only, see equation 
1 in Table 3). 
 * Number of quarters needed to reach 50% (80%) of the long-term effects. 
 ** Non interpretable: long term elasticity has a positive sign, which is contrary to the theory. 
Figure 5 
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Table 7 
Time series estimates with alternative measures of employment for euro area 
 Full-time equivalents Hours worked(1) 
Estimation period 1983Q4-2002Q1 1981Q3-2001Q4 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
V lnEt-1 0.564  
(7.26) 
0.530  
(4.33) 
V lnYt-2 0.105  
(2.73) 
0.072  
(1.53) 
V ln Y t-3 0.061  
(1.74) 
 
V ln (w/p) t-2 -0.067  
(-1.65) 
 
V ln (w/p) t-5 -0.071  
(-2.01) 
Error correction 
mechanisms 
-0.033  
(-1.37) 
-0.0719 
(-2.77) 
ln (w/p) t-1 
(long-term relationship) 
-0.320 -0.148 
Time trend (-1) 
(long-term relationship) 
-0.0037 -0.005 
Intercept 
(long-term relationship) 
-2.964 3.489 
Dummy 1984Q1 -0.0051  
(-3.51) 
-0.0035 
(-7.58) 
Dummy 1992Q3 -0.0049  
(-3.16) 
-0.005 
 (-9.87) 
Intercept -0.00019  
(-0.52) 
0.516 
 (2.76) 
Break  (1997Q1-2002Q2) 0.00083 
 (2.01) 
0.00155  
(2.69) 
Main statistics   
R2 0.796 0.717 
Adjusted R2 0.770 0.690 
Diagnostic tests(2) 
Durbin Watson 2.04 2.04 
LM (1) 0.08  
(0.77) 
0.09  
(0.77) 
LM (4) 7.73  
(0.10) 
3.46  
(0.48) 
ARCH(1) 0.35  
(0.55) 
8.64  
(0.003) 
WHITE 18.75 
 (0.13) 
27.77 
 (0.004) 
Normality 2.32 
 (0.31) 
20.03 
 (0.0005) 
RESET(1) 0.58 
 (0.45) 
0.49 
 (0.48) 
CHOW(3) 9.22 
 (0.82) 
9.08 
 (0.77) 
(1) As some heteroskedasticity has been detected., the t-statistics presented in this column are computed with the White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Euro area data on total hours worked are coming from Korteweg and Vijselaar (2002). 
(2) Asymptotic tests are presented, as the hypothesis of normal residuals is not always fulfilled (e.g. equation in hours worked). 
(3) Predictive failure test over the period 1999-2001 
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Table 8 
Testing a break in employment equation from 1997 with a panel of 21 OECD countries, 1977-2001 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP growth 0.568 0.567 0.563 0.565 
(15.09) (15.05) (14.98) (15.03) 
GDP growth (-1) 0.233 0.233 0.232 0.232 
(5.62) (5.63) (5.60) (5.61) 
GDP growth (-2) 0.114 0.112 0.110 0.110 
(2.98) (2.94) (2.87) (2.89) 
Real labour cost  -0.252 -0.252 -0.249 -0.249 
(-9.24) (-9.27) (-9.13) (-9.15) 
Real labour cost (-1) -0.036 -0.036 -0.032 -0.032 
(-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.17) (-1.17) 
Break in euro area countries 0.304    
(1.24)    
Break in countries outside euro area 0.048   0.047 
(0.19)   (0.19) 
Break in EU countries    0.320   
(1.48)   
Break in Non-EU   -0.088 -0.090  
(-0.30) (-0.30)  
Break in EU countries with faster employment growth from 1997    0.745  
(2.25)  
Break in EU countries with unchanged employment growth from 1997    0.018  
(0.06)  
Break in euro area countries with faster employment growth from 1997     0.741 
(2.24) 
Break in euro area countries with unchanged employment growth from 1997 -0.194 
(-0.55) 
Number of observations 523 523 523 523 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
R squared 0.504 0.504 0.506 0.509 
Poolability of euro area countries  W²(5)=24.11 X²(5)=24.29 X²(5)=23.94 X²(5)=25.00 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
Data sources: OECD, economic outlook. Author’s calculations. 
Note: The equations are estimated by fixed-effects (within) regression. GDP and w/p have been instrumented in order to overcome 
endogeneity problems. The list of instruments is the contemporaneous export of goods and services and real labour costs lagged by 
two quarters. Euro area countries with faster employment growth from 1997 onwards are Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain 
and Netherlands. Euro area countries with unchanged employment growth from 1997 are Austria, Germany, Greece, Finland and 
Portugal. EU countries with faster employment growth from 1997 onwards are Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and 
Netherlands. EU countries with unchanged employment growth from 1997 are Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, and 
Portugal, Sweden and the UK. These groups were constituted on the basis of the sign and significance of country break in 
preliminary regressions shown in Table 9. The poolability of restriction between the euro area countries and the other OECD 
countries is rejected by the Chow test on common slopes. This might generate a bias in parameter estimates, although the 
estimation may gain in efficiency when pooling. However, we keep pooling all OECD countries, as the purpose of the table is 
primarily to test the significance of the break with different groups of countries. 
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Table 9 
Testing a break in employment equation for each country from 1997 with a panel of 21 OECD 
countries, 1977-2001 
Country 
(euro area countries in italics) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Austria 0.533 0.375 0.375 
(1.38) (1.07) (1.07) 
Belgium 0.953 0.753 0.753 
(2.17)** (1.82)* (1.82)* 
Canada 0.676 0.320 0.320 
(0.68) (0.39) (0.39) 
Switzerland -0.236 -0.269 -0.269 
(-0.32) (-0.56) (-0.56) 
Germany -1.006 -0.848 -0.848 
(-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.22) 
Denmark 0.219 -0.099 -0.099 
(0.28) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Spain 3.589 3.264 3.264 
(2.94)*** (3.46)*** (3.46)*** 
Finland 2.009 1.218 1.218 
(1.47) (1.39) (1.39) 
France 1.240 1.189 1.189 
(2.99)*** (3.71)*** (3.71)*** 
United Kingdom 0.851 0.674 0.674 
(0.92) (1.12) (1.12) 
Greece -0.376 -0.891 -0.891 
(-0.33) (-0.97) (-0.97) 
Ireland 2.987 1.554 1.554 
(2.19)** (1.48) (1.48) 
Italy 1.055 1.288 1.288 
(1.88)* (3.34)*** (3.34)*** 
Japan -0.906 -0.469 -0.469 
(-2.47)** (-2.03)** (-2.03)** 
Netherlands 1.460 0.919 0.919 
(2.21)** (2.08)** (2.08)** 
Norway 0.376 0.219 0.219 
(0.50) (0.43) (0.43) 
New Zealand -0.401 -0.319 -0.319 
(-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.31) 
Portugal 1.156 0.906 0.906 
(1.30) (1.35) (1.35) 
Sweden 1.139 1.141 1.141 
(1.11) (1.53) (1.53) 
United States -0.495 -0.829 -0.829 
(-0.62) (-1.25) (-1.25) 
Observations 523 523 523 
Number of countries 21 21 21 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%,; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Note: The break is modelled by a break in the intercept (additional growth). The dependent variable is annual employment growth, 
while the regressors are GDP growth and real compensation per employee. Various lag specifications have been used regressors 
lagged by 2 years (equation 1) so as to avoid endogeneity problems; contemporaneous regressors plus their lagged values by 1 and 
2 years (equation 2) as lags of 3 years and more turn insignificant; lagged regressors by 1 and 2 years (equation 3). The three 
equations are estimated by generalised least squares with country fixed effects, allowing for heteroskedastic errors and common-
across-group first order serial correlation. 
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Table 10 
Impact of sectoral composition on total employment growth 
Industrial sectors  Average annual growth rate 
of employment 
Share in total employment Decomposition of employment growth
1997-2001 
1986-1991 1997-2001 1986-1991 1997-2001 Value-added 
growth  
Employment 
intensity 1
Agriculture -3.7 -1.5 7.1 4.5 0.8 -1.8 
Industry excluding construction 0.5 0.2 24.8 20.2 2.3 0.1 
Construction 1.7 0.6 7.3 7.1 0.2 2.6 
Trade, repairs, hotels and restaurant, transport 
and communication
2.0 1.9 24.0 25.1 3.7 0.5 
Financial, real estate renting and business 
services
4.9 4.8 9.8 13.6 3.5 1.4 
Public administration, education, health and 
other services
2.4 1.4 27.0 29.5 1.3 1.0 
Total 1.6 1.5 100 100 2.6 0.6 
Total with the sectoral structure of 1986-
1990. 
1.6 1.3    
Data sources: ESA95 national account, Eurostat. OECD, STAN databases. Author’s calculations.
1 Ratio employment growth / value-added growth. In other words, this is the empirical elasticity of employment to value added. 
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Table 11 
Panel data models of employment including labour market institutions 
Dependent variable: total employment (level in logarithm/employment rate) 
(Euro area countries(1). 1960-1997) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Employment 
(in log) 
employment 
(in log) 
employment 
(in log) 
employment 
(in log) 
employment 
rate (%) 
employment 
rate (%) 
Macroeconomic variables  
Ln (Employment) (-1) 0.862 0.856 0.857 0.788   
(19.55) (18.68) (18.71) (17.52)   
Employment rate (-1)     0.854 0.771 
(31.17) (23.71) 
Ln (GDP) -0.003 0.008 0.009 0.003   
(-0.77) (0.21) (0.23) (0.08)   
Ln (Real compensation per employee) -0.05 -0.045 -0.041 -0.083   
(-1.80) (-1.49) (-1.33) (-2.65)   
Institutions  
Employment protection  -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 0.113 -0.003 0.010 
(-2.16) (-1.93) (-2.06) (3.71) (-0.81) (0.92) 
Total taxes on labour  -0.137 -0.147 -0.147 -0.257 -0.101 -0.161 
(-3.09) (-2.92) (-2.91) (-1.87) (-4.34) (-2.79) 
Unionisation  -0.036 -0.040 -0.035 0.101 -0.005 0.128 
(-1.52) (1.58) (-1.34) (0.91) (0.42) (2.92) 
Bargaining coordination  0.007 -0.024 0.079 0.003 0.027 
(1.85) (-0.60) (3.28) (1.61) (2.85) 
Bargaining coordination squared   0.007    
(U-shape curve hypothesis)   (0.78)    
Unemployment benefits replacement ratio  0.005 0.008 0.112 -0.024 0.014 
(0.19) (0.28) (1.32) (-2.06) (0.37) 
Unemployment benefits duration  0.003 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.023 
(0.35) (0.48) (0.25) (0.33) (2.38) 
Interactions between institutions  
Employment protection* Total taxes on labour    -0.034  0.051 
(-0.47)  (1.96) 
Employment protection* Bargaining coordination    -0.050  -0.003 
(-4.72)  (-0.82) 
Employment protection* Unionisation    0.063  -0.025 
(1.85)  (-1.68) 
Employment protection* Unemployment benefits duration    -0.001  -0.021 
(-0.05)  (-2.40) 
Employment protection* Unemployment benefits replacement ratio    -0.053  -0.005 
(-0.96)  (-0.24) 
Total taxes on labour* Unionisation    -0.087  -0.044 
(-2.66)  (-3.43) 
Total taxes on labour* Bargaining coordination    0.074  -0.009 
(2.20)  (-0.56) 
Unemployment benefits replacement ratio* Unemployment benefits duration    -0.026  -0.014 
(-0.50)  (-0.54) 
Intercept  2.379 2.268 2.242 3.393 0.149 0.153 
(3.70) (3.41) (3.38) (5.18) (5.30) (4.90) 
Country specific trends No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 289 289 289 289 330 330 
Number of countries 9 9 9 9 10 10 
Cointegration  (Stationarity of residuals - Maddala-Wu test) X²(18)= 68.82 X²(18)= 68.43 X²(18)= 73.54 X²(18)= 73.53 X²(20)= 59.5 X²(20)= 60.8 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Poolability of euro area countries (2) W²(6)=112.9 X²(9)=114.8 X²(10)=110.81 X²(17)=99.5 X²(7)= 159.8 X²(15)=116.3 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sources: OECD economic outlook, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). Author’s calculations. 
(1) Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. Portugal is included in 
equation (5) and (6), 
(2) Chow test on common slopes between the euro area and other OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, US, Denmark and New Zealand).  
Note: The equations are estimated by generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors and common-across-group first 
order serial correlation. Each equation contains country dummies and time dummies (fixed effects). Nickell (1981) shows that the 
bias of dynamic (with lagged dependent variable among the regressors) fixed effects models with first order serial correlation is 
o(1/T) and therefore becomes less important as T grows. Moreover, Judson and Owen (1999) showed that the fixed effect estimator 
performs as well as many alternatives when T=30 (see Nunziata, 2001). Employment, GDP and real labour cost are included with a 
lag of two years to tackle endogeneity problems (reverse causality). The panel is unbalanced as some data are missing for the 1960s 
and 1970s.  
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Table 12 
Panel data models of employment including active labour market policies 
Dependent variable: total employment (level in logarithm/employment rate) 
(Unbalanced euro country panel (1), 1988-2001) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Employment (in 
log) 
employment (in 
log) 
employment (in 
log) 
employment rate 
(%) 
Ln (Employment) (-1)     0.904 
(17.19) 
Employment rate (-1) 0.873 0.865 0.877  
(12.84) (11.58) (11.35)  
Ln (GDP) (-2)  0.068 0.090 0.073  
(0.82) (0.97) (0.70)  
Ln (Real compensation per employee) (-2) -0.050 -0.038 -0.011  
(-0.83) (-0.48) (-0.13)  
Public employment services (-2) -0.022 -0.059 -0.058 0.009 
(-0.37) (-0.84) (-0.76) (0.29) 
Labour market training (-2) (2) -0.049 -0.055 -0.053 -0.021 
(-1.77) (-1.83) (-1.56) (-1.91) 
Tobal subsidised employment (-2) (a+b) 0.010    
(0.78)    
Subsidies to regular employment in the private sector (-2) (a) 0.031 0.026 0.020 
(1.10) (0.69) (1.76) 
Direct job creation (public or non-profit) (-2) (b) 0.009 0.010 0.000 
(0.50) (0.44) (0.01) 
Youth measures (-2) (3) -0.026  
(-0.47)  
Constant 0.779 0.381 0.402 0.067 
(0.73) (0.31) (0.27) (1.63) 
Country specific trends No No No Yes 
Number of observations 138 125 117 134 
Number of countries 10 10 10 10 
Cointegration  (Stationarity of residuals - Maddala-Wu test) X²(18)= 33.9 X²(18)= 48.14 X²(18)= 51.8 X²(20)= 23.6 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.259) 
Poolability of euro area countries (4) X²(6)= 5.33 X²(7)= 5.48 X²(8)= 13.14 X²(7)= 68.2 
(0.502) (0.602) (0.107) (0.000) 
Data sources: OECD economic outlook. Active labour market policies (ALMP) data stems from the OECD database on labour 
market programmes. Author’s calculations. 
(1) Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. 
(2) Training for employed and unemployed adults and those at risk 
(3) Measures for unemployed and disadvantaged youth and support of apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training 
(4) Chow test on common slopes between the euro area countries and other OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US, Denmark and New Zealand).  
Note: The equations are estimated by generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors and common-across-group first 
order serial correlation. Each equation contains country dummies and time dummies (fixed effects). Nickell (1981) shows that the 
bias of dynamic (with lagged dependent variable among the regressors) fixed effects models with first order serial correlation is 
o(1/T) and therefore becomes less important as T grows. Moreover, Judson and Owen (1999) showed that the fixed effect estimator 
performs as well as many alternatives when T=30 (see Nunziata, 2001). Employment, GDP and real labour cost are included with a 
lag of two years to tackle endogeneity problems (reverse causality). In order to take into account that active labour market 
measures are likely to impact employment gradually and to correct for possible endogeneity, ALMP (expressed as the share of 
ALMP expenditures in GDP) are estimated with a two year lag. The panel is unbalanced as some data are missing for the 19960s 
and 1970s. 
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Figure 6a
Relation between break in employment pattern and changes in employment structure 
Change in the sectoral composition of employment from the late 1980s 
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Data sources: New Cronos, Eurostat. The break in employment growth since 1997 corresponds to the panel estimation (model 1) 
reported in Table 9. Non significant breaks are set at zero. 
Figure 6b
Relation between break in employment pattern and changes in institutions  
Labour tax rate
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Figure 6b (continued) 
Relation between break in employment pattern and changes in institutions 
Temporary employment
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Data sources: OECD. Nickell and Nunziata (2001), Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2002). Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat). The 
break in employment growth since 1997 corresponds to the panel estimation (model 1) reported in Table 9. The results for 
bargaining co-ordinations are not displayed given the absence of any significant changes in most countries in the late 1990s. 
Figure 6c
Relation between break in employment pattern and changes in active labour market policies 
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Data sources: OECD. The break in employment growth since 1997 corresponds to the panel estimation (model 1) reported in Table 
9. 
Page 43 of 93
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
42
Acknowledgements 
 
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author only. I thank former colleagues of 
the ECB and in particular Franck Sédillot and Marie Diron for helpful comments and 
discussions.  
Page 44 of 93
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
43
References 
Algan Y., P. Cahuc and A. Zylberberg (2002), “Public employment. Does it increase 
unemployment?” ”, Economic Policy, April. 
Arrow, K., H. Chenery, B. Minhas and R. Solow (1961), “Capital-labour substitution and 
economic efficiency”, Review of Economics and Satistics, vol 43, pp. 225-250. 
Baltagi, B. (1995), Econometrics of panel data, Wiley, West Sussex. 
Belot, M. and J. van Ours (2000) “Does the recent success of some OECD countries in lowering 
their unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labour market reforms?”, CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 2492. 
Bentolila, S. and Bertola, G. (1990) “Firing costs and labour demand: how bad is 
eurosclerosis?”, Review of Economic Studies, 57, 381-420. 
Bertola, G. (1992) “Labour Turnover Costs and Average Labour Demand,” Journal of Labor 
Economics, 10, 389-411. 
Bertola, G., F.D. Blau and L.M. Kahm (2002) “Comparative analysis of labour market 
outcomes; Lessons for the US from the international long run evidence”, in A. Krueger and R. 
Solow, eds. The Roaring Nineties: Can full employment be sustained?, New York: Russell 
Sage. 
Blanchard, O. and J. Wolfers (2000) “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of 
European Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence”, Economic Journal Vol. 78(2), pp.182-187. 
Brown, R.L., J. Durbin and J.M. Evans (1975) “Techniques for testing the constancy of 
regression relationships over time”, Journal of the Royal statistical society, nZ2, pp 149-192.  
Caballero, R. and M. Hammour (1998). “Jobless growth: Appropriability, factor substitution 
and unemployment”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 48, 51-99 
Calmfors, L. and J. Driffill (1988) “Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic 
Performance”, Economic Policy, April. 
Page 45 of 93
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
44
Daveri, F. and G. Tabellini (2000) “Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial 
Countries”, Economic Policy, April. 
Decressin, J., M. Estevão, P. Gerson and C. Klingen (20001). “Job-rich growth in Europe”. 
Chapter 3 in “Selected Euro-Area Countries: Rules-Based Fiscal Policy and Job-Rich Growth in 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain”, Country Report No. 01/203, IMF. 
Duchêne, S. and A. Jacquot (1999), “Une croissance plus riche en emplois depuis le début de la 
décennie? Une analyse en comparaison internationale”, Document de travail de l’INSEE, 
G9901, Février. 
ECB (2002a), “The composition of employment growth in the euro area in recent years”, ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, November.  
ECB (2002b), “Labour market mismatches in euro area countries”, report prepared by the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks, March.  
Escriban A. and G. A. Pfann (1998), "Non linear error correction, asymmetric adjustment costs 
and cointegration" Economic Modelling, 15, 197-216 
European Commision (2000), “Performance of the European union Labour Market”, European 
Economy, No 4. 
Fagan, G., J. Henry and R. Mestre, “An Area-Wide Model (AWM) for the Euro Area”, ECB 
working paper series, No. 42, January. 
Garibaldi P. and P. Mauro (2002), “Employment growth. Accounting for the facts”, Economic 
Policy, April..  
Genre V. and Gómez-Salvador R. (2002), “Labour force developments in the euro area since the 
1980s”, July, ECB Occasional Paper No. 4 
Hamermesh D. and G.A. Pfann (1996), “Adjustment costs in factor demand”, Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol. XXXIV, pp. 1264-1292. 
Hamilton, J.D. (1994), Time series analysis, Princeton University Press. 
Page 46 of 93
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
45
IMF (1999), “Chronic unemployment in the Euro Area: Causes and Cures”, World Economic 
Outlook, May.  
Jackman, R., C. Pissarides and S. Savouri (1990), “Unemployment Policies”, Economic Policy,
October. 
Jackman, R., S. Roper (1987), “Structural Unemployment”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 49, 1. 
Korenman, S. and D. Neumark (2000), “Cohort crowding and youth labor markets: a cross-
national analysis.” In D. Blanchflower and R. Freeman, eds. Youth employment and joblessness 
in advanced countries, NBER, Chicago University Press. 
Korteweg, G. and F.W. Vijselaar (2002), “A Tale of Eight Legs on a Fly“, paper prepared for 
the annual conference of the International Association for Official Statistics, available at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/IAOSlondon2002/
Layard, R., Nickell, S. and Jackman, R. (1991), “Unemployment, macroeconomic performance 
and the labour market”, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Lazear, E. P. (1990) “Job Security Provisions and Employment”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 105.
Marimon, R. and M. Zilibotti (1998), “Actual versus virtual employment in Europe: Is Spain 
different?”, European Economic Review, 42(1).  
Mermet, E. (2001), “Wage Formation in Europe”, ETUI, Brussels.   
Morgan, J. (2001), “The employment security and the demand for labour in Europe”, Applied 
Economics, 33, 1763-1774. 
Morgan, J. and A. Mourougane (2001), “What can changes in structural factors tell us about 
unemployment in Europe”, ECB working paper series, No. 81, October. 
Nickell S. (1986), “Dynamic models of labour demand”, in Handbook of Labour Economics, 
volume 1, Edited by O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, Elsevier Science Publishers, 473-522. 
Page 47 of 93
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
46
Nickell, S. (1997), Unemployment and labour market rigidities: Europe versus North America, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3), 55-74. 
Nickell, S. (1998), Unemployment: question and some answers, The Economic Journal, 108
(May), 802-816. 
Nickell, S and L. Nunziata (2000), "Employment patterns in OECD countries," CEP Discussion 
Papers 448, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE 
Nickell, S, L. Nunziata, W. Ochel and G. Quintini (2001), "The Beveridge Curve, 
Unemployment and Wages in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s - Preliminary Version," 
CEP Discussion Papers 502, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. 
Nickell, S and L. Nunziata (2001). Labour Market Institutions Database. Centre for Economic 
Performance, LSE.
Nickell, S, L. Nunziata and W. Ochel (2002), "Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. 
What do we know?” Bank of England, May. 
Nunziata, L (2001). Institutions and Wage Determination: a Multi-Country Approach. Nuffield 
College Working Papers in Economics, (2001-W29), December. 
OECD (1994), The Jobs Study, Paris. 
OECD (1997), Employment Outlook, Paris. 
OECD (1999), Employment Outlook, Paris. 
Pichelmann, K. (2001), “Wage discipline in EMU. A Feature of the Early Years. Only?”, paper 
prepared for the 3rd ECB Labour Market Workshop, 10-11 December 2001. “How are wages 
determined in Europe?”. 
Rowthorn, R. (1999), “Unemployment. Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Growth”, 
IMF Working Paper series No. 99/43, March 1, 1999  
Scarpetta, S. (1996), “Assessing the role of labour market policies and institutional settings on 
unemployment: A cross-country study”, OECD Economic Studies 2(26), 43-82. 
Page 48 of 93
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
47
Endnotes 
i a represents the labour efficiency. It can also be seen as the degree of labour-augmenting technical 
progress (i.e. Harrod-neutral technical progress). 
ii Data are downloadable from the ECB website. See ECB working paper no. 42, “An area-wide 
model (AWM) for the euro area” by G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Mestre, January 2001. 
iii Other sources, for instance National Accounts, provide quarterly full-time equivalent series, which 
are unfortunately available for a short time period. 
iv The working-age population is defined as those aged 15-64 (OECD usual definition). 
v An alternative to the single equation approach would have been to estimate a system of two 
equations comprising a labour demand equation and a wage equation. However, such an approach would 
face a serious problem of identification, as all the terms of the long-run labour demand equation are also 
included in the long-run wage equation (see Morgan and Mourougane 2001). Indeed, by construction, the 
wage equation mixes labour demand aspects (firms’ willingness to pay wages) and labour supply effects 
(employees’ bargaining power). Moreover, this approach is still affected by the problem of lack of 
macroeconomic data on labour supply variables (skills, institutions, etc).  
vi However, the rising share of services, more protected in general from the international competition 
than industry, in the whole economy might have contributed to raising the aggregate mark-up, offsetting 
the effect of enhanced competition coming from the integration of product markets within the European 
Union. 
vii These contributions are computed other things remaining equal, i.e. supposing that the exogenous 
variables in the model are not interdependent. For instance, any rise in output would lead to higher 
employment and then lower unemployment, and thus, higher real wages, according to the Philips Curve. 
The rise in real labour costs would partly offset the initial effect of higher output on employment.  
viii The employment performance may also have been affected by the change in employment 
definition in Germany (measurement effect). The inclusion of low-paid part-time jobs in the new 
employment definition in Germany might have increased euro area employment growth by around +0.1 
p.p. year-on-year in 1997-2001. Indeed, these low-paid part-time jobs were not included in employment 
data in the past, while this category of workers grew at a very fast pace. However, the magnitude of this 
effect should be considered with considerable caution. 
ix Measured as the average contribution of the residual in the equation without break over the period 
1997-2001 (column 1 in Table 3). 
x While the decrease in the contribution of part-time work to net job creation was, of course, mainly 
accounted for by the slower increase in the part-time employment rate (by around 2 p.p.), the relative 
increase in hours worked in part-time in 1999-2001 played an additional role (by around 0.5 p.p.). The 
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latter effect is, however, relatively weak and seems to go in the same direction as the development in the 
part-time rate. 
xi In addition to the panel approach, we also re-estimated equations (1) and (2) presented in Table 9 
country by country so as to allow for different starting dates for the break. The results for equation 2 are 
presented between brackets. The statistical significance of the break is maximised when it starts in 1998 
(1998) for Belgium, in 1995 (1995) for Spain, in 1998 (1998) for France, in 1994 (1996) for Ireland, in 
1998 (1999) for Italy and in 1997 (1995) for the Netherlands. However, the magnitude and the 
significance of the break are not dramatically affected when we make it start in 1997 for all countries. 
xii A similar equation has been estimated for the EU (see column 3), leading to the same conclusion.  
xiii For the most recent observations, see also S. Nickell, L. Nunziata and W. Ochel "Unemployment 
in the OECD since the 1960s. What do we know?” Bank of England, May 2002. 
xiv Indeed, EPL can raise insider power and therefore lower effective labour supply by reducing the 
wages expected by outsiders. 
xv Called also union density. This is the percentage of reported union members among wage and 
salaried employees. 
xvi From an econometric point of view, this is referred to as semi-poolable time series. 
xvii As the test relies on the assumption of no cross-country correlation, we control for cross-country 
correlation by means of time dummies in the equation.  
xviii This indicator is an average macroeconomic measure computed from national account data. This 
average tax wedge can also be seen as the difference between the after-tax disposable labour income 
received by wage earners and total labour costs borne by employers.  
xix This corresponds to the hypothesis of “U-shaped curve”, presented by Calmfor and Driffil (1988): 
very decentralised or, at the other extreme, very centralised wage bargaining structure would lead to a 
better outcome in terms of unemployment and employment than the intermediate case of negotiation by 
branch. 
xx It is indeed difficult to identify the causal relationship between employment and ALMP. 
Sluggishness in the labour market induces mechanically an increase in ALMP, as more people become 
eligible. On the other hand, a high level of ALMP may improve the employment prospects of the 
unemployed and increase employment.  
xxi It should be noted that the compositional effects and the impact of institutions are not mutually 
exclusive, as structural reforms may also boost service sector growth. 
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DID THE PATTERN OF AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT GROWTH CHANGE IN THE 
EURO AREA IN THE LATE 1990S? 1 
Gilles Mourre2
Abstract 
The paper examines whether the pattern of growth in euro area employment seen in the period 1997-
2001 differed from that recorded in the past and what could be the reasons for that. First, a standard 
employment equation is estimated for the euro area as a whole. This shows that the lagged impact of both 
output growth and real labour cost growth, together with a productivity trend and employment “inertia”, 
can account for most of the employment developments between 1970 and the early 1990s. Conversely, 
these traditional determinants can only explain part of the employment development seen in recent years 
(1997-2001). Second, the paper shows sound evidence of a structural break in the aggregate employment 
equation in the late 1990s. Third, the paper provides some tentative explanations for this change in 
aggregate employment developments, using in particular country panels of institutional variables and of 
active labour market policies but also cross-sectional analyses. Among the relevant factors likely to have 
contributed to rising aggregate employment in recent years are changes in the sectoral composition of 
euro area employment, the strong development of part-time jobs, lower labour tax rates and possibly less 
stringent employment protection legislation and greater subsidies to private employment. 
 
JEL Classification numbers: C2, E24, H50, J23. 
Key words: Euro area; Aggregate employment; Demand for labour; Labour market institutions; Active 
labour market policies.   
 
1 The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European 
Central Bank or the European Commission. All the errors and omissions are my own. I thank in particular Neale Kennedy, Geoff 
Kenny, Franck Sédillot, Véronique Genre, Jörg Decressin, Julian Morgan and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and 
discussions. I am grateful to Franck Sédillot and Marie Diron who provided me with some econometric programs. 
2 European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. The paper was written when the author 
was working at the European Central Bank. E-mail address: gilles.mourre@cec.eu.int 
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Non-technical summary 
The ratio of employment growth to real GDP growth indicates that real GDP growth was more job 
intensive in the euro area over recent years, compared with the late 1980s. The aim of this paper is to 
explain the high employment growth observed in 1997-2001 by means of a standard labour demand 
equation and to see whether the pattern of aggregate employment in the euro area has changed in recent 
years. Compared to the late 1980s, the strong growth in employment observed between 1997 and 2001 is 
partly explained by a buoyant, albeit somewhat lower, economic growth and by much lower labour cost 
growth.  
However, the standard employment equation failed to fully account for the good employment 
performance observed in the euro area in 1997-2001. The introduction of a break from 1997 onwards 
turns out to be statistically very significant, improves greatly the quality of the dynamic simulation and 
increases the stability of the equation. The forecasting performance of the equation also improves 
strongly. This break may be interpreted as the additional employment growth recorded between 1997 and 
2001 which cannot be explained by traditional determinants. Although the choice of the starting date of 
the break is somewhat arbitrary, its statistical significance is maximised when it starts in 1997.  
When the employment equation is re-estimated with employment measured in terms of full-time 
equivalents and hours worked instead of the number of people employed, the break is still significant, 
although of a lesser magnitude. This indicates that developments in part-time employment have 
contributed to the strong employment performance in the 1990s but cannot fully account for the break in 
labour demand in the euro area. 
Taking account of heterogeneity across OECD countries, panel data estimates show that most euro 
area countries (representing almost two thirds of euro area employment) have experienced a positive 
break in their aggregate labour demand since 1997. However, five euro area countries, including 
Germany, did not record any significant change in their employment equation in the late 1990s. No 
positive break is significant for countries outside the euro area. Panel data estimates broadly confirm the 
timing of the break, starting in around 1997, although the precise dating varies slightly across countries.  
In addition to part-time developments, three possible causes for the change in the aggregate labour 
demand are examined: changes in the sectoral composition of euro area employment, developments in 
labour market institutions and the impact of active labour market policies. A simple accounting exercise 
indicates that the average annual growth rate of employment in the period 1997-2001 would have been 
0.2 percentage point lower if the sectoral composition of employment had remained the same as in 1986-
1991. Therefore, the higher weight of fast growing and job-intensive sectors, such as market-related 
services, in the late 1990s compared to the past, is likely to have contributed to fostering employment 
growth in recent years. 
Albeit difficult to show clearly, labour market reforms and changes in institutions in many euro area 
labour markets may also have played a role in the recent good employment performance in the euro area. 
Panel data estimates suggest that total taxes on labour negatively affect employment growth. More mixed 
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evidence suggests that employment protection legislation may reduce employment growth, whilst the 
level of bargaining coordination is found to be positively correlated with employment. As a result, the 
decline in total labour tax rates, in particular on low-wage employees, is likely to have positively 
influenced job creation.   
Active labour market policies might also contribute to explaining the good employment performance 
recorded in the recent period. However, the results coming from tentative panel data estimates appear 
very mixed and display a low level of statistical significance. The aggregate expenditure devoted to 
public employment services and labour market training are not significant. While subsidies to private 
employment may be positively related to the employment rate, the impact of direct job creation in the 
public or non-profit sectors is clearly insignificant. The effect of measures for youth employment does not 
come out clearly.  
The role of structural changes may be highlighted further by relating the cross-country differences 
observed in the employment pattern since 1997 to changes recorded in the sectoral composition of 
employment, institutions and active labour market policies in the second half of the 1990s. A clear 
negative relationship emerges between the tax wedge and the presence of a positive break in recent 
employment performance. Although the other variables are less tightly linked to the presence of positive 
break in employment pattern, the cross-country analysis confirms that the impact of changes in the 
sectoral composition of employment is correlated to employment performance. The strong decline in 
employment protection legislation in some countries may also explain partly their good employment 
performance. Moreover, part-time employment rate and subsidies to regular employment in the private 
sector may have helped improve employment performance in the late 1990s in some countries. 
Conversely, other institutions such as unionisation, benefit replacement rate, benefit duration or most 
active labour market policies (public employment services, labour market training and direct job creation 
in the public sector) do not display any obvious link with the employment performance in euro area 
countries in the late 1990s. These cross-country results broadly support the general findings arising from 
panel data analysis.  
Overall, part-time employment developments, changes in the sectoral composition of employment 
and decreasing labour tax rates are good candidates to explain at least partly the break in aggregate 
employment equation seen in the late 1990s.  
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1. Introduction 
Until recently, the emphasis in the economic literature to account for the improvement in labour 
markets in Europe in 1997-2001 was mainly put on the decline in structural unemployment. It has been 
argued that overly rigid institutional structures have prevented the necessary adjustment to changes in the 
economic environment, thereby leading to higher or more persistent unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; 
Nickell 1997; Layard and Nickell, 1998; Morgan and Mourougane, 2001). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) 
attribute the rise in unemployment in Europe to the interaction of institutions with adverse 
macroeconomic shocks. 
More recently, several studies have dealt with employment growth directly to shed some light on the 
strong improvement of labour market performance in many European countries in the late 1990s. From a 
descriptive point of view, Duchêne and Jacquot (1999) investigate whether a break occurred in the trend 
growth rate of labour productivity per person employed during the first half of the 1990s in the main 
OECD countries and whether such a break could be accounted for by changes in relative factor costs or in 
the number of hours worked. Sögner and Stiassny (2002) estimate Okun’s law (unemployment/GDP 
relationship) for 15 OECD countries (covering half of the euro area) and checks for its structural stability. 
They also examine whether the changes in the Okun coefficients come from changes in the relationship 
between employment and GDP or in that between labour force and GDP. Applying a new panel error 
correction technique, Hahn (2004) shows that the long-term structure of labour demand is broadly equal 
across the OECD countries over the period from 1970 to 2000. However, adjustment speed of actual 
employment to the long-run equilibrium is much higher in countries with flexible labour markets, such as 
the USA and UK, than in most EU15 countries covered by the study, which display broadly similar 
adjustment speeds. Some other studies have focused on specific aspects to explain the improvement in net 
employment creation, such as wage discipline in EMU (Pichelmann, 2001) or the change in employment 
composition (ECB, 2002a). Using panel data on employment for seven European countries in the period 
1981-1994, Morgan (2001) shows that the long-run level of labour demand in terms of total hours worked 
(but not in terms of number of persons employed) can be increased by employment security, derived from 
surveys of employers, while the latter can have significant effects in slowing down the dynamic 
adjustment of labour demand. Some more comprehensive studies have attempted to survey all the 
changes capable of accounting for the higher job intensity in Europe (European Commission, 2000; 
Decressin et al., 2001; Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002). The geographic focus varies across these studies (EU 
countries, large euro area countries or OECD countries). This paper continues in this vein by analysing 
the determinants of employment for the euro area as a whole, while not neglecting heterogeneity across 
countries. From a methodological point of view, the paper follows that of Fagan, Henry and Mestre 
(2001), who estimated an aggregate dynamic employment equation for the euro area with an error 
correction mechanism. While Fagan et al. ran their equation up to 1997, this article focuses on the pattern 
of employment in recent years.  
The employment rate in the euro area, at almost 64% in 2001, was considerably lower than in the 
United States (nearly 75%). The period 1997-2001 however saw a protracted period of sustained 
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5
employment growth, which led to a fall in unemployment despite a strong increase in the labour force. 
Total employment has grown at an average year-on-year rate of 1.5% from 1997 to 2001, compared with 
a decline of 0.2% between 1990 and 1997. This corresponds to an increase of around 7 million in the 
number of persons employed, whereas earlier in the 1990s, by comparison, employment fell by over 1 
million. This strong employment growth is also noticeable when compared with the previous period of 
strong growth, registered in the late 1980s. Since the late 1960s, as seen in Table 1, the average growth 
rate recorded in the late 1990s is only comparable to that recorded in the second half of the 1980s (1.4%). 
However, the ratio of employment growth to real GDP growth indicates that real GDP growth was more 
job intensive in the recent period, at 0.6, compared with 0.4 in the late 1980s. Likewise, the ratio of 
employment growth to real GDP growth became higher in the late 1990s in the euro area than that in the 
US and the UK. By contrast, this ratio was lower than in the US during past periods of expansion and also 
lower than that in the UK in the late 1980s.  
What accounts for this development? This paper argues that the traditional determinants (GDP 
growth, labour cost developments, trend productivity) do not fully explain the strong employment growth 
recorded in the euro area in the recent period. Sound econometric evidence, based mainly on time-series 
analysis, but also on panel data analysis, suggests that the recent employment performance is related to a 
structural change in aggregate employment behaviour in the euro area. Looking further, in order to 
explain the factors underlying this change, a panel of time-varying institutions and measures of active 
labour market policies is used. This latter methodological approach can be associated with the branch of 
the literature initiated by Scarpetta (1996) and extended by Belot and van Ours (2000) and Nickell et al. 
(2001). These articles used cross-sectional or pooled time series data on indicators of labour market 
performance and labour market institutions to account for unemployment differentials across countries. 
However, the results found using institutional variables are often unclear or not robust, partly due to 
measurement problems.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a standard employment equation, 
estimated for the euro area as a whole. Section 3 shows the existence of a structural break in the 
aggregated employment equation in the late 1990s. Section 4 provides some tentative explanations for 
this change, using in particular country panels of institutional variables and of active labour market 
policies as well as cross-sectional analysis. 
2. Estimation of a standard employment equation 
2.1 Theoretical framework  
A CES production function with two production factors and constant returns to scale, proposed by 
Arrow et al. (1961), provides a simple and standard analytical framework to highlight the effect of the 
main determinants of labour demand:  
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with Y standing for output, L for labour, K for capital, a for labour productivity3, L for the labour-intensity 
of the method of production and  for the elasticity of substitution between effective labour (aL) and 
capital. Then, the first order condition of firm’s profit maximisation leads to equate the marginal labour 
productivity to real compensation per employee w/p. This leads to the following expression:
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We suppose conventionally that labour productivity growth is constant and positive with log at =!.t
and ! >0, reflecting trend technological progress. After rearranging and writing in logarithms, we end up 
with:  
log Lt = log Yt -  log( w/p) - ( 1- ) !.t +  log L
The employment level depends on total output, a labour productivity trend and real labour costs. The 
elasticity of substitution is conventionally between zero and unity (imperfect substitution between 
production factors), the elasticity of employment to real labour costs is negative and lower than 1 in 
absolute value and the coefficient of productivity trend is negative as well. If the elasticity of substitution 
is equal to unity, the production function becomes a Cobb-Douglas function and labour demand has the 
following form: log Lt = log Yt - log(w/p) + log L., with a unit elasticity of real labour costs and no time 
trend. 
There are a number of other possible equivalent ways to specify the long run condition for 
employment in this framework. For instance, instead of the profit maximisation problem, Fagan et al. 
(2001) used the employment level induced by the inverted (Cobb-Douglas) production function, which 
depends upon real GDP, total capital stock and trend total factor productivity. Alternatively, following the 
cost-minimisation problem subject to a given capital stock, employment becomes a function of real GDP, 
technical progress and relative factor prices. However, the choice of the profit-maximisation approach 
stems from the fact that real wage statistics are more reliable than capital stock data or capital cost data 
and available on a quarterly basis. Moreover, in this specification, employment only depends on output 
and labour market variables (labour costs and trend labour productivity). 
In this setting, real labour cost elasticity gives a measure of the elasticity of substitution N. In 
economic terms, this parameter means that a growth of 1% in the relative cost of labour to capital will 
lead to a growth of N% in the ratio of capital to labour. More formally, we have N =
d(K/L)/d(w/r)*r/w*L/K, where r is the cost of capital. The interpretation of the time trend should also be 
discussed. The absolute value of its (negative) coefficient depends negatively on the elasticity of 
substitution N and positively on trend labour productivity, mirroring technology developments, assumed 
 
3 a represents the labour efficiency. It can also be seen as the degree of labour-augmenting technical progress (i.e. Harrod-neutral 
technical progress). 
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7
to be constant over time. The constant, N.log L, which turns into µ.N.log L with µ being the mark-up over 
costs in the case of imperfect competition (see Morgan, 2001), depends positively on the elasticity of 
substitution N, the labour-intensity of the method of production L and the market power of firms µ.  
In this setting, the elasticity of employment to output is unity. Calling into question this result would 
mean to allow for the interaction between the level of labour productivity and the level of output. For 
instance, if we set log at =!.t +( log Y with 0<(<1, the elasticity becomes less than unity. Such an 
interaction is difficult to explain. One could suppose that the level of output reflects the level of 
knowledge in the economy, as argued in some endogenous growth models. But no sound evidence has 
been provided on this. Therefore, in the subsequent section, we will assume an elasticity of employment 
to output equal to unity and use panel data analysis to test it. 
 
2.2 Data used 
The euro area data for the period 1985-2002 are built from the aggregation of quarterly ESA95 
National Account series. Before 1985, they have been back-cast using data of the ECB area-wide model4.
Employment series refers to total employment (employees plus self-employed) in terms of persons 
employed. An alternative could have been to reason in terms of hours worked or full-time equivalents. 
This choice was motivated by two reasons. First, part-time employment data, needed to compute full-time 
equivalents, are missing before 1991 on a quarterly basis (Eurostat quarterly labour indicator) and are not 
available on an annual basis before 1983 (European Community Labour Force Survey)5. Second, 
compared with the number of employed persons, the estimates of hours worked are more fragile and the 
concept itself more uncertain (hours effectively worked or hours usually worked in the reference period). 
The number of persons employed is more consistent with the measures of unemployment and the labour 
force. However, tentative estimates based on hours worked and full-time equivalent employment will be 
provided in this paper as a robustness check.  
Labour cost data refer to total compensation per employee deflated by euro area GDP deflator at 
market prices. This series encompasses total labour costs, i.e. direct (wages) and indirect (social security 
contribution) remuneration. However, unlike employment data, compensation per employee covers only 
employees’ compensation, excluding remunerations of the self-employed, which are unavailable. This 
could slightly bias the estimation of the employment equation, because it is implicitly assumed that 
average compensation received by the self-employed has grown at the same pace as compensation per 
employee. 
 
4 Data are downloadable from the ECB website. See ECB working paper no. 42, “An area-wide model (AWM) for the euro 
area” by G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Mestre, January 2001. 
5 Other sources, for instance National Accounts, provide quarterly full-time equivalent series, which are unfortunately 
available for a short time period. 
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2.3 Estimation method 
The explanatory variables being non-stationary, we have chosen an error-correction-model 
specification, allowing for distinguishing the short-term dynamics from the long-term determinants 
(corresponding to the cointegration relation). The use of quarterly data starting in 1970 yields a relatively 
long time series dimension, allowing for the precise analysis of the dynamics, which generally requires 
data with reasonable frequency and implies a large loss of degrees of freedom. Moreover, the relatively 
long period chosen covers at least three full economic cycles, which will help to better distinguish the 
cyclical behaviour of labour demand from possible structural changes.  
From an economic point of view, the use of an error-correction model is justified by the existence of 
costs of adjustment, which induce a slow response to shocks to labour demand (e.g. changes in GDP or 
labour costs), as pointed out by the large literature on dynamic labour demand, e.g. Nickell (1986). As 
explained by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), these adjustment costs are of two kinds. First, the net costs 
are those of changing the numbers of employees in the firms, for instance the loss of efficiency due to the 
internal reorganisation of work. Gross costs of adjusting labour demand are those related to the flows of 
workers entering or leaving the firm, such as search and recruitment costs, slow adjustment of capital 
stock, the cost of training and job protection legislation (mandatory notice of layoffs, severance payment, 
cost of legal disputes, etc).  
In order to disentangle the long-term equilibrium relation between variables and the dynamics, we 
will follow the two-step procedure of Engel and Granger (see Hamilton, 1994). We will estimate first the 
long-run level of labour demand and identify a cointegration relationship between variables. Second, an 
equation in first differences will be estimated to capture dynamics. In order to avoid endogeneity, the 
contemporaneous quarterly change in GDP and real labour costs is omitted. An estimate using 
instrumental variables approach, where the contemporaneous change in GDP is instrumented by lagged 
changes in GDP, confirms that this current term is not significant. Conversely, it turns out to be highly 
significant with a standard OLS approach, suggesting that the contemporary correlation between GDP 
and employment growth mainly captures the reverse causality, i.e. the current impact of employment to 
activity.  
With E, Y and w/p standing respectively for total employment, real GDP and real labour costs, euro 
area labour demand can be modelled by the following equation, where -, ! and ( are estimated separately 
by OLS.  
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However, this labour demand equation is estimated with actual employment data, which by definition 
satisfy the equilibrium condition between labour demand and the labour supply. Therefore, labour supply 
variables may have explained a part of the employment developments. Due to lack of data or data 
limitation, it appears quite difficult to control for labour supply variables in a macroeconomic equation. 
For instance, institutional data, constructed by Nickell and Nunziata (2001) and available at the country 
level, cannot be aggregated at the euro level, given the strong methodological differences in the 
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9
construction of those series across countries. Moreover, the low number of observations limits the 
relevance of using them in a time-series approach. Another relevant supply-side dimension, the structure 
of population by educational attainment, cannot be taken into account, because of the lack of a long-time 
series. However, some demographic variables may be used to control for a part of the labour supply 
effects. The working age population6 appears a natural control variable positively related to employment 
growth, as it represents the potential labour force. Moreover, recent studies, such as Korenman and 
Neumark (2000) or Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002) point to the importance of the age structure 
of the working-age population and in particular of the relative size of the youth population to explain 
aggregate employment and unemployment rates. Young people are most affected by labour market 
institutions which impose some kind of wage floor (like minimum wages, collective bargaining, 
employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, etc.), which translates into a low youth 
employment rate compared to that of prime–age people. The increase in the relative size of the young 
population is supposed to decrease employment. Thus, an equation controlling for these shifts in the size 
and structure of the working-age population is estimated. However, as shown in equations (1) to (4) in 
Table 2, the effect of both demographic variables turns out to be clearly insignificant. This suggests that, 
given the lack of specific labour-supply-related data, actual employment developments in the euro area 
seem to be captured reasonably well by the standard labour demand equation7. This is highlighted by 
equations (1) and (2) reported in Table 3 (see also the Annex for further details regarding the estimation 
results).  
 
3. Is there any evidence of a structural change in recent years?  
This section presents some evidence pointing to a structural change in the employment behaviour in 
the late 1990s. First, a break is introduced in the euro area employment equation, in which the number of 
person employed measures employment. The role of the break and the traditional determinants is 
carefully assessed. Second, the robustness of the break is tested by using other measures of employment 
(full-time equivalent, hours worked), which permits to evaluate the importance of part-time employment 
developments. Lastly, the question of cross-country heterogeneity is addressed. 
 
3.1 Evidence of a break in the standard employment equation for the euro area 
Some evidence points to a possible change in the pattern of euro area employment in recent years. 
Although the overall stability of the equation is not rejected, some instability is visible at the end of the 
 
6 The working-age population is defined as those aged 15-64 (OECD usual definition). 
7 An alternative to the single equation approach would have been to estimate a system of two equations comprising a labour 
demand equation and a wage equation. However, such an approach would face a serious problem of identification, as all the 
terms of the long-run labour demand equation are also included in the long-run wage equation (see Morgan and Mourougane 
2001). Indeed, by construction, the wage equation mixes labour demand aspects (firms’ willingness to pay wages) and labour 
supply effects (employees’ bargaining power). Moreover, this approach is still affected by the problem of lack of macroeconomic 
data on labour supply variables (skills, institutions, etc).  
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period when performing a recursive estimate of the coefficient. This may explain why the Error 
Correction Mechanism (ECM) term is not highly significant (see equations 1 and 2 in Table 3). Another 
piece of evidence is the poor performance of the dynamic simulation at the end of the period, which 
clearly overestimates employment in the early 1990s and underestimates it in the late 1990s (Figure 1). 
Dynamic contributions computed on the basis of equation 1 in Table 3 and shown in Figure 2 suggest that 
residuals have substantially contributed to employment growth in the period 1997-2001, explaining 0.7 
p.p. of total employment growth each year on average. This is confirmed by the instability displayed by 
equations (1) and (2) in Table 3 from around 1997, when estimating its coefficients recursively. 
3.1.1 Quality of the dynamic simulation and the forecasting performance when allowing for a break 
In order to identify possible changes in employment pattern, we reestimate equation (2) (one-step 
ECM procedures) in Table 3 by allowing for breaks in all variables. Then we sequentially remove the 
least significant break until only statistically significant breaks remain. As shown in detail in Table 4, this 
sequential procedure leads to retaining only one break, in the intercept. According to various criteria 
(adjusted R square, t-value of the break, RMSE of recursive out-of-sample forecast), the break appears 
most relevant when starting in 1997. This is in line with the result yielded by the dynamic contribution of 
the residuals from the traditional equation and the recursive estimates of the coefficient. The break still 
appears highly significant and its magnitude is unchanged, when controlling for some observable labour-
supply effects mentioned earlier (working age population and the relative size of the youth population). 
This emerges when comparing equations (3) and (4) in Table 2 with equation (4) in Table 3.  
The break in intercept can be interpreted as the additional employment growth recorded between 
1997 and 2001 which cannot be explained by traditional determinants. It corresponds to an upward shift 
in the long term relationship in levels, which translates into a higher but temporary employment growth 
rate until the new long-term level is reached, unlike a break in the trend, which would imply a permanent 
change in the growth rate. According to the theoretical model presented earlier in section 2, the increase 
in the intercept may be interpreted either as an increase in the mark-up µ, which seems unlikely given the 
increase in competition induced by the continuing integration in the Single market8, or a rise in the 
labour-intensity of the method of production L.
When including a break, the adjusted R² from the two-step ECM estimation increases from 0.61 to 
0.65 (see equations 1 and 3 in Table 3) and the dynamic simulations derived from either one-step or two-
step estimation appear to be very close to the actual series and much better than that given by equation 1 
without a break (see Figure 3). The introduction of the break makes the error correction mechanism very 
significant, which was not the case without a break. Each coefficient of the equation appears very stable. 
The long-term elasticity of real labour costs (estimated in one step) is slightly lower than that estimated in 
one step without the break. The strong elasticity of employment to real labour costs in equation 1 could 
 
8 However, the rising share of services, more protected in general from the international competition than industry, in the 
whole economy might have contributed to raising the aggregate mark-up, offsetting the effect of enhanced competition coming 
from the integration of product markets within the European Union. 
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have artificially captured the structural changes, which occurred in a period of moderate wage 
developments recorded since 1997. 
Another illustration of the inability of traditional determinants to fully explain employment growth in 
the recent period is provided by the results of the out-of-sample dynamic performance. Over 3 million 
jobs created in the euro area since 1999 are not explained by the employment equation estimated between 
1970Q1 and 1999Q1 (see Figure 4). In other words, 0.7 p.p. of the annual employment growth between 
1999Q2 and 2002Q2 does not stem from the traditional determinants. More formally, the root mean 
squared errors (RMSEs) of the out-of-sample forecasts are one third lower when allowing for a break.  
3.1.2 The role of traditional determinants, when allowing for a break  
To illustrate the role of traditional determinants of employment over time, the dynamic contributions 
to employment growth9 are computed from equation (4) with a break (see Table 3). The results regarding 
the contribution of GDP or real labour costs are robust, whatever the equation considered (1), (2), (3) or 
(4) and are well reflected in Figure 2. For instance, they are not much affected by the inclusion of a break 
in the equation. Conversely, the reaction lags are very sensitive to the specification of the equation and, 
particularly, to the inclusion of a break. 
The positive employment performance in the euro area in 1997-2001 resulted to a large extent from 
the robust economic growth in the second half of the 1990s (see Figure 2). Over the period 1980-2000, 
employment seems to have been largely driven by GDP growth. For instance, the poor employment 
performance in the early 1990s is clearly related to weak activity growth. Employment equations 
(including all the lags up to five quarters) also allow for computing the adjustment lag of employment to 
GDP over different sub-periods. As shown in Table 5, in the period 1970-2002, employment growth is 
found to react to GDP with a mean lag of around eight quarters, when we estimate the equation with all 
lags. The mean lag seems to have decreased in the late 1980s-early 1990s and increased in the recent 
period. However, when we use an alternative equation, retaining the significant lags only, these results are 
reversed and the mean lag of GDP between 1985 and 2002 shortens somewhat down to 6 quarters, which 
leads us to interpret the mean lag with considerable caution. Conversely, the median (50% of the long-
term effect) reaction lag to GDP seems to have been fairly stable over the past thirty years, at around 4.5 
quarters. On the whole, reaction lags tend not to signal any noticeable change in the adjustment process 
of employment to GDP.
As shown by Figure 2, the deceleration of real labour cost growth between 1992 and 1996 set the 
conditions for dynamic employment growth. By contrast with the late 1980s, real labour cost 
developments remained moderate during the last upturn of 1997-2000, contributing partly to the 
historically strong employment expansion. If real labour cost developments had been the same as those 
 
9 These contributions are computed other things remaining equal, i.e. supposing that the exogenous variables in the model 
are not interdependent. For instance, any rise in output would lead to higher employment and then lower unemployment, and 
thus, higher real wages, according to the Philips Curve. The rise in real labour costs would partly offset the initial effect of higher 
output on employment.  
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recorded in the late 1980s, annual employment growth would have been 0.3-0.4 percentage point lower 
than actually seen since mid-1997. Although most of the slowdown in employment growth is attributable 
to the economic downturn, the slight increase in real labour costs since mid-2000 seems to have adversely 
affected employment growth in 2001 and the first half of 2002. Likewise, the poor employment 
performance in the early 1990s, mainly related to the slowdown in activity, was worsened by the strong 
labour cost increase. The slow employment growth recorded in the late 1970s despite buoyant economic 
growth was also likely linked to the substantial increase in real labour costs seen in this period. The 
various economic equations estimated here suggest that the mean lag of employment to real labour cost 
developments between 1985 and early 2002 was around 5 quarters and the median lag between 3 and 5 
quarters (see Table 6). Moreover, it seems that the mean and median reaction lags of employment to 
labour cost have not changed significantly since 1997. 
 
3.2 Robustness of the break while considering hours worked or employment in full-time equivalents  
Evidence of a structural break in employment behaviour suggests that employment developments 
could also have been affected by labour market reforms or structural changes (in addition to the indirect 
effect passing through labour cost moderation, such as the social security contribution cuts). A natural 
candidate to explain the lower trend productivity in the late 1990s is the rising share of part-time in total 
employment, meaning that an increasing proportion of those employed is working less. This development 
has caused a reduction of hours worked per person of 0.25 p.p. per year on average between 1997 and 
2001, according to Labour Force Survey data. As this effect combined with possible measurement 
effects10 may explain around 0.3 p.p. out of 0.7 p.p. unexplained by traditional determinants11, other 
structural changes or labour market reforms should have played a role in explaining the remaining 0.4 p.p. 
in the change in employment behaviour. Moreover, the timing of part-time employment developments 
indicates that they are unlikely to account for a break in employment in the late 1990s. Indeed, the 
positive contribution of part-time jobs to total employment growth declined from the late 1990s, as shown 
by the reduced difference between employment growth measured in number of persons and in full-time 
equivalents (see Figure 5). The difference between employment growth measured in number of persons 
and in full-time equivalents, which was around 0.4 p.p. on average between 1991 and 1998, fell to around 
0.1 p.p. between 1999 and 200112. Looking further back, part-time employment developments and their 
 
10 The employment performance may also have been affected by the change in employment definition in Germany 
(measurement effect). The inclusion of low-paid part-time jobs in the new employment definition in Germany might have 
increased euro area employment growth by around +0.1 p.p. year-on-year in 1997-2001. Indeed, these low-paid part-time jobs 
were not included in employment data in the past, while this category of workers grew at a very fast pace. However, the 
magnitude of this effect should be considered with considerable caution. 
11 Measured as the average contribution of the residual in the equation without break over the period 1997-2001 (column 1 
in Table 3). 
12 While the decrease in the contribution of part-time work to net job creation was, of course, mainly accounted for by the 
slower increase in the part-time employment rate (by around 2 p.p.), the relative increase in hours worked in part-time in 1999-
2001 played an additional role (by around 0.5 p.p.). The latter effect is, however, relatively weak and seems to go in the same 
direction as the development in the part-time rate. 
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contribution to total employment growth were broadly similar to those recorded in the late 1980s, when 
economic growth was much less job-intensive.  
To underpin this result, the equation with break (equation 3 in Table 3) is re-estimated with 
employment in terms of full-time equivalents (see Table 7). While the error correction mechanism 
appears much less significant, the break in intercept is still significant at 5%. The break is of a lower 
magnitude than in the equation estimated with employment in terms of persons: around 0.3 p.p. annual 
employment growth in full-time equivalents has not been explained by traditional determinants between 
1997 and 2001. Of course, this lower part of unexplained employment growth after 1997 reflects the 
effect of part-time on recent employment growth. This result is broadly consistent with those found by 
Garibaldi and Mauro (2002): increases in part-time employment in the services sector, where most part-
time jobs were created, have been associated with increases in the overall number of jobs but most likely 
also with partial crowding out of full-time jobs.  
The use of full-time equivalents improves the measure of “effective” labour but does not take into 
account developments in usual hours worked by full-time workers as well as changes in the number of 
working days. Thus, the equation with break has also been re-estimated with employment in terms of 
total hours worked (see Table 7). The series was built by Korteweg and Vijselaar (2002), using OECD 
data on total hours worked in the economy, completed by Labour Force Surveys data on usual weekly 
working hours. A positive break from 1997 onwards is significant at the 1% level and corresponds to a 
0.4 p.p. unexplained annual growth in hours worked in the period 1997-2001. This latter result should be 
taken with caution, given the fragility of working time measurements, but confirms the break in 
employment behaviour at the end of the period.  
 
3.3 Taking account of heterogeneity across countries 
In order to infer that employment behaviour has changed in recent years, it is necessary to check if 
the break for the euro area as a whole is broadly based across countries or if this only reflects specific 
features in a very limited number of countries. In addition, the findings presented for the euro area as a 
whole might be slightly affected by an aggregation bias, due for instance to changes in country weights 
over time. For this purpose, fixed-effects regressions are run with a macro-panel of 21 OECD countries. 
A break in employment equation, modelled as a dummy for the period 1997-2001, is tested for the EU15 
countries and euro area countries (see Table 8). As shown in columns 1 and 2, the break for these two 
groups of countries appears fairly low and insignificant. The break for countries outside the euro area and 
the EU15 turns out to be negative and clearly insignificant. 
As shown in Table 9, regressions allowing for a break for each euro area country seem to indicate 
that a group of countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) have recorded a 
stronger employment growth that is not fully explained by classical determinants. Indeed, the break in 
these countries appears significant in all regressions (except for Ireland). It should also be noted that the 
significance of the break is not strongly affected by the choice of its starting date. Although its exact 
dating is somehow arbitrary, we make the break start from 1997 onwards in order to be consistent with 
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results for the euro area shown in section 3.1. This choice is broadly supported by country-by-country 
estimates13. The break turns out to be particularly significant for Spain and France. Additional growth 
recorded in these countries since 1997 varies from 0.9 percentage point in Belgium to 3.6 percentage 
points in Spain. Conversely, the second group of countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece and 
Portugal) has not experienced any clear change in their employment pattern. In other words, in these 
countries, employment growth was mostly explained by the traditional determinants in the recent years. 
For most OECD countries outside the euro area, the break is insignificant, with the exception of Japan, 
where it is negative. The regression in column 4 of Table 8 summarises these results by testing the break 
globally for both groups. In the first group, accounting for around 59% of the total euro area employment, 
more than 0.7 p.p. employment growth has not been explained by traditional determinants since 1997, this 
break being statistically significant. The break is negative but clearly insignificant in the second group of 
countries14. These results confirm that most euro area countries have experienced positive structural 
changes but not all of them.
4. What factors may account for a change in aggregate employment pattern in recent 
years? 
This section enters a very difficult area, trying to explain the change in employment pattern, shown 
empirically in the previous section. Three aspects are investigated in this section: changes in the sectoral 
composition of the euro area employment, developments in labour market institutions and the impact of 
active labour market policies. 
 
4.1 Changes in the sectoral composition of euro area employment 
Compositional effect may have played a part in explaining development in aggregate employment 
growth, as suggested by Marimon and Zilibotti (1998). A simple accounting exercise indicates that the 
average annual growth rate of employment between 1997-2001 would have been around 0.2 percentage 
point lower if the sectoral composition of employment had remained the same as in 1986-1991 (see Table 
10). Indeed, the share of sectors with high employment growth (i.e. market-related services, such as trade, 
repairs and financial and business services) was much higher at the start of the economic expansion of the 
late 1990s than at the beginning of the boom of the late 1980s. Those sectors are characterised by a strong 
economic growth, high employment intensity or both. The strong employment growth in market-related 
services is broadly attributable to a very strong value-added growth. Job intensity of growth, measured by 
the ratio of employment to value-added growth, appears to have been very high (1.4) in financial, real 
 
13 In addition to the panel approach, we also re-estimated equations (1) and (2) presented in Table 9 country by country so as to 
allow for different starting dates for the break. The results for equation 2 are presented between brackets. The statistical 
significance of the break is maximised when it starts in 1998 (1998) for Belgium, in 1995 (1995) for Spain, in 1998 (1998) 
for France, in 1994 (1996) for Ireland, in 1998 (1999) for Italy and in 1997 (1995) for the Netherlands. However, the 
magnitude and the significance of the break are not dramatically affected when we make it start in 1997 for all countries. 
14 A similar equation has been estimated for the EU (see column 3), leading to the same conclusion.  
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estate renting and business services in 1997-2001, while it was higher in trade, repairs, hotels and 
restaurant, transport and communication than in industry excluding construction.
Symmetrically, sectors with low or negative employment growth (such as agriculture and industry 
excluding construction) had a lower weight in total employment in the late 1990s than in the previous 
decade. Given that, as a first approximation, total employment growth can be computed as the sum of 
sectors’ employment growth weighted by the share of each sector in total employment, the movements in 
the sectors’ share might affect total growth even though there is no change in sectoral growth. Another 
way to consider the compositional effect is to notice that employment growth in all sectors (except 
agriculture) was lower in the period 1996-2001 than in 1986-1991, while aggregate employment growth 
was broadly similar, as seen in Table 10. 
 
4.2 The importance of labour market institutions  
It was found earlier that part-time development contributed to higher employment growth in the 
1990s but cannot fully explain the break in the late 1990s. The evidence of the effect of structural reforms 
on macroeconomic labour market variables appears patchy in the literature, mainly due to the difficulty to 
quantify and study labour market reforms at a macro-level. Moreover, most of the labour market 
institution data used in this section are not available for the late 1990s. Thus, the goal of this section will 
remain modest, attempting to collect first quantitative evidence by introducing labour market variables in 
employment equations. While past studies mainly focused on unemployment, this section emphasises the 
effect of labour market institutions on net employment creation.  
Table 11 shows the panel data estimates of employment models when including annual data on 
labour market institutions as collected from various sources by the OECD and Nickell and Nunziata 
(2001)15. Two sets of institutions should be distinguished: those influencing both labour demand and 
labour supply (job protection legislation16, total taxes on labour, unionisation17 and wage bargaining co-
ordination) and those mostly affecting labour supply (benefit replacement rates and benefit durations). 
Various estimations have been carried out. Regression (1) uses the first group of institutions, while 
regressions (2) to (8) also integrated the second group of institutions. Following the approach of Belot and 
van Ours (2000), interactions between institutions are taken into account in regressions (4) and (6). Such 
interactions are used as a robustness check and take into account the fact that similar reforms could have 
different effects in different countries and comprehensive reforms are more effective than piecemeal 
labour market policy18.
15 For the most recent observations, see also S. Nickell, L. Nunziata and W. Ochel "Unemployment in the OECD since the 
1960s. What do we know?” Bank of England, May 2002. 
16 Indeed, EPL can raise insider power and therefore lower effective labour supply by reducing the wages expected by 
outsiders. 
17 Called also union density. This is the percentage of reported union members among wage and salaried employees. 
18 From an econometric point of view, this is referred to as semi-poolable time series. 
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The equations estimated follow two slightly different specifications. Equations (1) to (4) correspond 
to the traditional employment equation, estimated in section 2 for the euro area as a whole. They use total 
employment (in logarithm) as the dependent variable and include also the GDP level and real labour 
costs. Thus, the following general specification is estimated, where E denotes employment (either in log 
or in rate), Y real GDP and w/p real labour costs (compensation per employee deflated by the GDP 
deflator), the i and t are country- and time- indices and k kinds of institutions Xk are taken into account 
and interact with each other: 
Equations (5) and (6) refer to the specification used by Nickell et al. (2001), in which the dependent 
variable is the employment rate (i.e. the ratio of total employment to population aged 15-64) and GDP 
and real labour costs are replaced by country trends.  
All the equations are estimated over a sample of euro area countries, as the test for poolability 
suggests that the effect of explanatory variables is very different between euro area countries and the 
other OECD countries. Indeed, a Chow test strongly rejects the hypothesis of common slopes across these 
two groups. A possible and tentative explanation may be that the effect of institutions is stronger in 
countries facing significant rigidities in their labour market, which seems to be the case for most euro area 
countries. Therefore, the equations shown in Table 11 are estimated on a panel of euro area countries 
only. However, the results in terms of sign and significance are not very different when including other 
OECD countries in the sample. Moreover, as shown by Nunziata for the institutions (2001), there is clear 
evidence of non stationarity for many of the variables used in the equations. We therefore need to test for 
cointegration so as to check the absence of spurious regressions. The Madala-Wu test consists in testing 
for unit roots in the residuals of the equations19. The test clearly rejected the hypothesis of residuals 
having a unit root. 
Several findings should be emphasised. First, the total labour tax rates20 (called also tax wedge, i.e. 
employees' and employers' social security contributions and personal income tax as percentage of total 
labour costs) appears to be significant in all equations. Its coefficient is always negative and relatively 
stable, at around -0.15. Given the autoregressive term, this means that, other things being equal, a decline 
of 10 percentage points in the total labour tax rate would lead in the long run to a rise of around 11% in 
the level of employment (models 1 to 3) or to 7 percentage point increase in the employment rate (model 
5), which represents a fairly strong effect. Moreover, total labour taxes have an additional adverse effect 
when combined with a high union density.  
 
19 As the test relies on the assumption of no cross-country correlation, we control for cross-country correlation by means of 
time dummies in the equation.  
20 This indicator is an average macroeconomic measure computed from national account data. This average tax wedge can 
also be seen as the difference between the after-tax disposable labour income received by wage earners and total labour costs 
borne by employers.  
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Second, evidence appears mixed for employment protection legislation (EPL). It is found to be 
negatively correlated to employment in all equations without interactions. However, it only appears 
significant in models (1) to (3). When adding interaction between institutions, the effect of employment 
protection legislation on its own becomes positive. Nonetheless, it has a negative impact on employment 
when combined with the level of bargaining co-ordination (model 4) or unemployment benefit duration 
(model 6). The latter institutions are likely to raise the bargaining power of insiders and then the 
equilibrium wage, which lowers effective labour supply by reducing the prospect of the “outsiders” of 
being hired. EPL may exacerbate this phenomenon of labour supply segmentation by limiting further the 
ability of outsiders to compete with insiders. 
Third, the level of bargaining coordination is found to be positively correlated with employment. 
While it appears strongly significant (at a level of 1%) in models (4) and (6), it is not significant in the 
other equations21. This is supported by the economic literature (e.g. Nickell et al., 2001), which found that 
highly co-ordinated bargaining offset the adverse effects of unionisation on employment.  
Fourth, apart from some interactions with the tax wedge or EPL, unionisation, the unemployment 
benefits replacement ratio and unemployment benefit duration are found not significant in general (or 
displaying an unexpected sign in equation 6). While the unemployment benefits replacement ratio seems 
to adversely affect the employment rate, it has no impact on total employment and the effect is not robust 
to the introduction of interactions22.
Five, equations (4) and (6) confirm that institutions play a role, not only in isolation but also 
interacting between each other. However, the significance of these interactions does not appear robust to 
the specification chosen (logarithm of total employment versus employment rate), except for the joint 
negative effect of total labour taxes and unionisation. 
The interpretation of the findings requires much caution, as some results are not robust across the 
various models estimated. Indeed, the small number of time varying observations for institutions as well 
as high collinearity among institutional variables does not permit to identify precisely the impact of 
individual institutions. Furthermore, the use of country and time dummies (i.e. two way fixed effects) 
may remove part of the explanatory power of the institutional variables, as the latter displayed little time 
variations and may have followed similar time trends across countries. Moreover, the role of some 
institutional variables such as taxation and employment protection in determining employment has 
extensively been discussed in both the theoretical and empirical literature and appears not to be clear cut. 
However, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) show that higher taxes lead to higher unemployment and lower 
 
21 Moreover, model (3) permits to reject the hypothesis of the convexity in the effect of bargaining coordination, as 
modelled by the square of bargaining co-ordination variable. This corresponds to the hypothesis of “U-shaped curve”, presented 
by Calmfors and Driffill (1988): very decentralised or, at the other extreme, very centralised wage bargaining structure would 
lead to a better outcome in terms of unemployment and employment than the intermediate case of negotiation by branch. 
22 These results should however be interpreted with caution, as fixed-effect estimates may underestimate the impact of 
institutions when they vary very little over time or undergo similar changes at the same time across most countries. Moreover, a 
weak or insignificant coefficient might not mean that an institution has no effect on specific countries. For instance, as found by 
Gonzalo (2002), the duration of unemployment benefit entitlement seems to negatively affect the transitions from unemployment 
into wage employment in Spain.  
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output growth. An increase in labour taxation is likely to raise total labour costs, leading to lower 
employment growth. The econometric results shown in Table 11 go in this direction. In some countries, 
labour tax rates are unevenly distributed among wage earners, being particularly high for low wage 
earners, youth or low-skilled workers, therefore reducing further their employability. Hiring the low 
skilled is all the more costly for employers as employment protection limits the possibility of firing 
workers who turn out to display low productivity.  
The impact of employment protection legislation on employment appears ambiguous. Bentolila and 
Bertola (1990) argue that both job creation and destruction will decrease as a result of an increase in 
labour adjustment costs but the resulting effect on total employment in the long run is uncertain. Bertola 
(1992) suggests also that individual sectors may be affected differently by job protection, which 
complicates the analysis at the aggregate level. However, Caballero and Hammour (1998) have 
highlighted that a rise in firing costs may lead firms to substitute capital for labour in the medium run, 
resulting in a lower job intensity of economic growth. Empirically, the evidence is mixed. Using cross-
sectional data, Nickell (1997) and Nickell et al. (2001) do not find a significant effect of employment 
protection legislation on unemployment rates and employment rates across countries, whereas Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000) argue that higher employment protection leads to a larger effect of adverse 
macroeconomic shocks on unemployment. Exploiting the time-series dimension of the data, Lazear 
(1990) and Scarpetta (1996) show a positiv  relationship between firing costs and unemployment, while 
Morgan (2001) finds that employment security slows the dynamic adjustment of employment but does 
not increase the number of persons employed.  
 
4.3 The role of active labour market policies 
In addition to the institutions mentioned above, active labour market policies (ALMP) may have 
played a role in explaining the good employment performance in the late 1990s. Table 12 presents panel 
data estimates using OECD data (database on labour market programmes). In order to take into account 
the fact that active labour market measures are likely to impact employment growth gradually and to 
correct for endogeneity problems23, ALMP are computed as the share of ALMP expenditures in GDP 
lagged by two years. The results are based on a euro area panel, but for most models they are found 
broadly similar between euro area countries and other OECD countries, according to a Chow test on 
common slopes.  
The findings are mixed in the sense that none of the ALMP expenditures appears statistically very 
significant. However, it should also be noted that coefficient signs are consistent across models (1), (2), 
(3) and (4), except for public employment training. Model (1) shows that expenditures devoted to public 
employment services, labour market training and subsidised employment are not significant (at a 5% 
 
23 It is indeed difficult to identify the causal relationship between employment and ALMP. Sluggishness in the labour 
market induces mechanically an increase in ALMP, as more people become eligible. On the other hand, a high level of ALMP 
may improve the employment prospects of the unemployed and increase employment.  
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level). In model (2), subsidies to employment have been broken down into subsidies to regular 
employment in the private sector and direct job creation in the public sector. The former, which comes 
down to lowering taxation rates and reducing labour costs, is positively correlated with employment 
growth, although not statistically significant. Direct job creation in the public or non-profit sector does not 
seem to affect future employment growth with a very low coefficient and t-statistic. In a recent study, 
Algan et al. (2002) argue that job creation in the public sector crowds out private sector employment and 
can even eventually lead to a decline in total employment. The attraction for public activities (positively 
depending on the size of rent in the public sector and the degree of substitutability of public and private 
jobs) exerts upward wage pressure in the private sector, reducing employment in this sector. Moreover, 
direct job creation might contribute to increase taxes, which have distorting effects on economic activity. 
In model (3), expenditures for youth have been included but are not significant at all. Their sign is not the 
one expected. Model (4) is a re-estimation of model (2) using the employment rate instead of the natural 
logarithm of total employment. Subsidies to regular employment in the private sector become significant 
at 10% level, while the t-statistic for direct job creation is close to zero.  
All in all, the results based on aggregate data are not very robust and display a low level of statistical 
significance. Scarpetta (1996) confirms that some ALMP, such as job assistance, training programs and 
financial assistance for firm creation can stimulate employment. Nevertheless, Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991) emphasise that the composition of spending is as important as the level. Moreover, as 
pointed out by Decressin et al (2001), ALMP tend to be ineffective when they are not focused on well-
defined beneficiaries. For example, broadly based employment subsidies may have little effect relative to 
the level of expenditures because of dead-weight losses or substitution effects detrimental to non-
subsidised employment. Using country evidence, Decressin et al. (2001) conclude that the increased 
employment intensity of growth is unlikely to have primarily been caused by ALMP. However, the 
increase in subsidies to regular employment in the euro area private sector, which doubled as a percentage 
of GDP from 1994 to 2000, might have contributed to the positive employment performance. This 
argument is close to that stated earlier about the reduction in labour taxes in the euro area. Employment in 
public administration increased relatively slowly in the late 1990s compared with that in other sectors, 
which may also have supported employment creation in the private sector (see Algan et al., 2002). 
 
4.4 The role of structural changes in explaining cross-country differences in recent employment 
performance 
The role of structural changes may be highlighted further by relating the cross-country differences 
observed in the employment pattern since 1997 to changes recorded in the sectoral composition of 
employment, institutions and active labour market policies in the second half of the 1990s. As mentioned 
earlier in section 3.3, some countries (Austria, Germany, Greece, Finland and Portugal) do not seem to 
have experienced any significant change in their aggregate employment pattern, while the others benefit 
from higher than expected employment in the recent period.  
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Looking at the observed cross-country differences and as shown by Figures 6a, 6b and 6c, a clear 
negative relationship emerges between labour tax rates and the presence of a positive break in recent 
employment performance, confirming the panel results presented in section 4.2. In particular, countries 
with higher than expected employment in the late 1990s experienced a decline (Ireland, Netherlands, 
Spain) or at least no movement in their labour tax rate (Belgium and France), while most of the countries 
which saw no significant change in their employment growth in the late 1990s faced an increase in their 
tax wedge. One should also notice that the countries experiencing a rise in the tax wedge did not face 
lower than expected employment owing perhaps to an offsetting effect of the concomitant loosening in 
their employment protection legislation. Looking deeper into tax reforms, while there have been across-
the-board tax-cutting measures in most euro area countries in recent years, some particular attention has 
been paid to reducing tax pressure at the lower end and in the middle of the income distribution (see also 
ECB 2002b). The strong decline in tax rates on low-wage earners recorded in the late 1990s (by 3 p.p.), 
which was mainly related to cuts in employers’ social security contribution, is indeed a natural candidate 
to account for the strong employment performance in this period.  
Although the other variables are less tightly linked to the presence of a positive break in employment 
pattern, some interesting results have been found. The cross-country analysis confirms that the impact of 
changes in the sectoral composition of employment is positively correlated to employment performance, 
but to a much lesser extent than tax wedge. In particular, it may have contributed to explaining the break 
in employment seen in particular in France, Italy, Ireland and Spain (see Figure 6a). The strong decline in 
employment protection legislation in Belgium, Italy and Spain may also partly explain the good 
employment performance recorded in these countries. In line with the results found in section 4.3, Table 
6c suggests that subsidies to regular employment in the private sector may also have helped in improving 
employment performance in the late 1990s in Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Conversely, 
Austria, Germany, Greece and Portugal may have suffered from a decline in the rate of subsidies to 
private sector employment. Lastly, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and, to a lower extent, Italy may 
have benefited from the strong rise in the part-time employment rate, whereas Greece and Finland 
suffered from relatively weak developments in part-time employment. However, the role of part-time job 
developments in accounting for cross-country differences in employment performance does not appear 
predominant as Germany, and to a lesser extent Portugal and Austria, also experienced a significant rise 
in the part-time employment rate24.
Conversely, other institution such as the share of temporary jobs, union density, benefit replacement rate, 
benefit duration or most ALMP (public employment services, labour market training and direct job 
creation in the public sector) do not display any evident clear link with the employment performance in 
euro area countries in the late 1990s. This is again broadly in line with panel data findings reported 
earlier. However and more tentatively, it is plausible that Germany and Portugal may have suffered from 
the strong concomitant increase in the replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefit. At the 
 
24 Reflecting the interactions between labour market institutions, the part-time employment rate has also been influenced by 
other labour market institutions, as shown by Buddelmeyer et al. (2004). 
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other extreme, Spain which experienced the strongest break in the employment performance may have 
taken advantage of the decline in benefit replacement rate and union density in addition to that in 
employment protection legislation and tax wedges. 
 
To summarise, tentative evidence seems to point to the positive impact of structural changes on 
employment creation. However, the timing of the structural break (from 1997-1998 onwards according to 
panel data and time series estimates) is important. The IMF (1999) argues that it is not a coincidence that 
positive effects of structural reforms appear in economic upturns, even though the reforms were 
implemented earlier. This argument is similar to that developed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 
according to whom a labour market outcome results from the interaction of both macroeconomic shocks 
and institutions. The increase in “potential employment”, induced by structural changes and reflected by 
higher job intensity, will raise potential output, which will require a corresponding increase in effective 
demand so that reforms could translate into effective increases in output and employment. Furthermore, 
following a rationale close to Rowthorn’s (1999), an increase in capital stock, which is mainly driven by 
the cycle, may also be required for the positive effects of structural reforms to actually lead to create new 
jobs. An alternative (and not mutually exclusive) explanation for the timing of the impact of labour 
market reforms may be that many of them have been taken in the mid-1990s and may have materialised 
gradually over the late 1990s (see ECB 2002a). 
 
Conclusion 
The present paper aims to better understand the recent employment growth in the euro area. 
Econometric estimations of labour demand show that employment growth inertia coupled with a 
productivity trend and the lagged impact of both economic growth and real labour costs can largely 
explain employment developments between 1970 and the mid-1990s. Moreover, relatively low increases 
in real labour costs in the late 1990s compared to the 1980s certainly contributed to the good employment 
performance recorded in recent years. However, employment equations estimated for the period 1970-
1996 explain only partly the strong employment growth observed between 1997 and 2001. The inclusion 
of a break from 1997 onwards improves substantially the fit of the dynamic simulation. The significance 
of the break seems robust, whatever the measure of employment used (employment per head, full-time 
equivalents or hours worked). Moreover, most euro area countries (but not all) appear to have 
experienced a break in the late 1990s.  
Compositional effects, linked to the higher share of fast growing and job-intensive sectors such as 
market related services in total employment in the late 1990s, is likely to have slightly raised aggregate 
employment growth in recent years. Albeit difficult to show clearly, the break in employment would also 
suggest that labour market reforms and/or structural changes might have played a role in the good 
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employment performance in the euro area25. The strong development of part-time jobs in the 1990s should 
have played a positive part and lower labour tax rates should have contributed to the good employment 
performance since 1997 in the euro area. More tentatively, the relaxation of job protection legislation may 
have facilitated employment creation in the late 1990s. Furthermore, some active labour market policies, 
such as subsidies to private employment, might also have played a positive role, although the results do 
not appear very significant or robust. Conversely, most ALMP are found clearly insignificant in 
explaining employment developments. It should be borne in mind that data limitations, particularly for 
labour market institutions (poor time series dimension and unavailability of very recent data) and active 
labour market policies (highly aggregated data), as well as the lack of robustness of some results call for 
considerable caution in explaining the break in employment. The results presented in the last section on 
the impact of institutions and active labour market policies illustrate the difficulty of highlighting the 
effect of structural reforms at a macroeconomic level, as confirmed by numerous studies. 
25 It should be noted that the compositional effects and the impact of institutions are not mutually exclusive, as structural 
reforms may also boost service sector growth. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Employment, activity and job intensity during economic expansions  
(Average annual change %, unless otherwise indicated) 
 Period of economic expansion 
Euro area 1969-1973 1976-1980 1986-1990 1997-2000
total employment 0.8 0.4 1.4 1.6 
GDP 5.3 3.3 3.3 2.8 
ratio employment growth / GDP 
growth
0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 
United Kingdom  
total employment 0.3 0.1 1.9 1.4 
GDP 2.6 1.8 3.3 2.9 
ratio employment growth / GDP 
growth
0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 
US  
total employment 1.6 3.0 2.1 1.6 
GDP 2.9 3.7 3.2 4.2 
ratio employment growth / GDP 
growth
0.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 
Sources: European Commission, Eurostat, OECD and author’s calculations. 
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Table 2 
OLS Estimates of employment equations, controlling for some labour supply effects (age structure and 
working age population).  
 Equation (1) 
without break  
(one step-
estimation)(1) 
Equation (2) 
Without break  
(one step-
estimation)(1) 
Equation (3) 
without break  
(one step-
estimation)(1) 
Equation (4) 
without break  
(one step-
estimation)(1) 
Estimation period 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics)
] lnEt-1 0.39 
(4.1)
0.41 
(2.5)
0.32 
(3.3)
0.30 
(3.1)
] lnYt-1 0.06 
(1.84)
0.07 
(1.9)
0.06 
(1.8)
0.06 
(2.0)
] ln Y t-2 0.06 
(1.59)
0.07 
(1.7)
0.06 
(1.6)
0.06 
(1.8)
] ln (w/p) t-5 -0.047 
(-1.24)
-0.038 
(-0.9)
-0.028 
(-0.76)
-0.020 
(-0.56)
Error correction mechanism 
 
-0.0456 
(-1.82)
-0.030 
(-2.5)
-0.062 
(-2.4)
-0.061 
(-2.6)
ln (w/p) t-1 
(long-term relationship) 
-0.021 
(-1.8)
-0.017 
(-2.8)
-0.027 
(-2.1)
-0.026 
(-2.4)
Time trend t-1 
 (long-term relationship) 
-0.0000 
(-1.48)
0.0000 
(1.5)
-0.0002 
(-3.17)
-0.0002 
(-2.0)
Intercept 
(long-term relationship) 
ln (Working age population) (2) 
(long-term relationship) 
-0.021 
(-1.036)
0.014 
(0.67)
ln (age structures) (3)  
(long-term relationship) 
0.00062 
(0.17)
0.0053 
(1.59)
Dummy 1975Q2 -0.0035 
(3.2)
-0.0035 
(-2.6)
-0.003 
(-3.1)
-0.003 
(-2.8)
Dummy 1984Q1 -0.0052 
(-9.1)
-0.0056 
(-8.7)
-0.005 
(-9.4)
-0.005 
(-10.9)
Dummy 1992Q3 -0.00426 
(-7.2)
-0.0044 
(-7.3)
-0.004 
(-7.8)
-0.004 
(-8.1)
Intercept 0.096 
(0.47)
2.1 
(3.2)
-0.36 
(-1.7)
0.22 
(-2.9)
Break  (1997Q1-2002Q2)   0.0026 
(4.7)
0.0027 
(4.8)
Main statistics     
R2 0.652 0.656 0.681 0.687 
Adjusted R2 0.618 0.622 0.648 0.653 
Durbin Watson 2.05 2.03 2.0 1.99 
(1) As some heteroskedasticity has been detected., the t-statistics presented in this column are computed with the White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
(2) The working-age population is defined as those aged 15-64 (OECD usual definition). 
(3) The relative size of youth/prime age population, defined as the size of population aged 15-24 over the population aged 25-54. 
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Table 3 
OLS Estimates of employment equations with and without break 
 Equation (1) 
without break  
(two step-
estimation) 
Equation (2) 
Without break (1)
(one step-
estimation) (1) 
Equation (3) 
With break (1) 
(two step-
estimation) (1) 
Equation (4) 
with break (1) 
(one step-
estimation) (1) 
Estimation period 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 1970Q1-2002Q2 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics)
] lnEt-1 0.498 
(7.11)
0.409 
(4.74)
0.319 
(4.69)
0.319 
(3.34)
] lnYt-1 0.0561 
(1.81)
0.069 
(2.08)
0.055 
(2.08)
0.057 
(1.71)
] ln Y t-2 0.0476 
(1.48)
0.068 
(1.90)
0.055 
(1.90)
0.053 
(1.54)
] ln (w/p) t-5 -0.0636 
(-2.55)
-0.99 
(-1.90)
-0.039 
(-1.22)
-0.033 
(-0.88)
Error correction mechanism -0.027 
(-1.40)
-0.031 
(-1.67)
-0.065 
(-2.93)
-0.067 
(-2.91)
ln (w/p) t-1 
(long-term relationship) 
-0.448 -0.550 
(-1.59)
-0.448 -0.407 
(-2.3)
Time trend t-1 
 (long-term relationship) 
-0.003 -0.0022 
(-1.30)
-0.003 -0.00212 
(-2.95)
Intercept 
(long-term relationship) 
-3.30 -3.30 
Dummy 1975Q2 -0.0042 
(-2.24)
-0.0033 
(-2.9)
-0.0036 
(-4.73)
-0.0034 
(-3.2)
Dummy 1984Q1 -0.0061 
(-3.42)
-0.0056 
(-12.8)
-0.0052 
(-13.21)
-0.0053 
(-12.0)
Dummy 1992Q3 -0.004 
(-2.08)
-0.004 
(-7.64)
-0.004 
(-8.63)
-0.0041 
(-7.6)
Intercept 0.0005 
(1.15)
-0.113 
(-1.69)
0.0004 
(1.21)
-0.21 
(-2.72)
Break  (1997Q1-2002Q2)   0.0021 
(4.53)
0.0021 
(3.78)
Main statistics     
R2 0.632 0.654 0.680 0.681 
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.621 0.654 0.649 
Diagnostic tests     
Durbin Watson 2.13 2.05 1.99 1.99 
LM (1) 0.16 
(0.20)
0.61 
(0.43)
0.02 
(0.88)
0.016 
(0.90)
LM (4) 7.79 
(0.10)
7.13 
(0.13)
2.77 
(0.60)
2.82 
(0.59)
ARCH(1) 0.38 
(0.54)
1.54 
(0.21)
3.10 
(0.08)
3.22 
(0.07)
WHITE 17.14 
(0.19)
37.46 
(0.003)
25.6 
(0.03)
39.3 
(0.003)
Normality 3.88 
(0.14)
0.63 
(0.73)
0.77 
(0.68)
0.76 
(0.68)
RESET(1) 5.74 
(0.02)
7.76 
(0.005)
3.32 
(0.07)
3.00 
(0.09)
CHOW(3) 14.57 
(0.48)
8.70 
(0.894)
5.14 
(0.99)
5.46 
(0.99)
(1) As some heteroskedasticity has been detected., the t-statistics presented in this column are computed with the White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
(2) Asymptotic tests are presented. 
(3) Predictive failure test over the period 1999Q1-2002Q2. 
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Figure 1 
Total employment: dynamic simulation without break 
observed versus fitted  
 
level in thds 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic contributions to the annual growth rate of total employment   
(from equation 1 in Table 3, without break) 
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Table 4 
Sequential selection of different possible breaks (from 1997 onwards) in the standard employment equation 
Breaks in the equation The least significant break 
(removed in the following steps)
P-value of t-
statistics 
Adjusted R-
squared 
Step 1 
(allowing for breaks 
in all variables) 
]lnEt-1 ]lnYt-1  ]lnYt-2 ]ln(w/p)t-5 
ECM ln(w/p)t-1  TIME-TREND  
INTERCEPT 
]lnEt-1 0.76 0.636 
Step 2 ]lnYt-1  ]lnYt-2 ]ln(w/p)t-5 ECM 
lnw/pt-5  ln(w/p)t-1  TIME-TREND  
INTERCEPT 
Ln(w/p)t-1 0.68 0.639 
Step 3 ]lnYt-1  ]lnYt-2 ]ln(w/p)t-5 ECM 
TIME-TREND  INTERCEPT 
ECM 
(lnEt-1-lnYt-1)
0.76 0.636 
Step 4 ]lnYt-1  ]lnYt-2 ]ln(w/p)t-5 
TIME-TREND  INTERCEPT 
TIME-TREND 0.13 0.646 
Step 5 ]lnYt-1  ]lnYt-2 ]ln(w/p)t-5 
INTERCEPT 
]ln(w/p)t-5 0.18 0.645 
Step 6 ]lnYt-1  ]lnYt-2  INTERCEPT ]lnYt-2 0.07 0.647 
Step 7 ]lnYt-1  INTERCEPT ]lnYt-1 0.31 0.647 
Final step INTERCEPT INTERCEPT 0.002 0.649 
Note: This table is based on the re-estimation of equation 1 of Table 3, but using a one-step ECM estimation procedures and 
allowing for breaks in all variables (Step 1). The least significant break is removed sequentially in the following steps. The 
results are obtained with OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Newey-West method). 
Figure 3 
Dynamic simulation with a break since 1997 
observed versus fitted ; level in thds  
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Figure 4 
Forecasting performance between 1999Q2 and 2002Q2 
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Table 5 
Lagged reaction of employment to GDP growth (in quarters) 
period of estimation 1970Q1 - 1996Q4 1970Q1 – 2002Q2 1985Q1 – 1996Q4 1985Q1 – 2002Q2 
50%* lag  4.6 (4.3) 5.0 (4.6) 4.0 (6.9) 4.4 (4.9) 
80%* lag 12.0 (11.3) 11.3 (10.9) 6.9 (13.5) 10.3 (7.4) 
mean lag  7.8 (7.4) 7.5 (8.1) 5.9   (8.8) 8.6  (5.6) 
Note: lagged reactions given by an equation including all lags of endogenous and exogenous variables up to 5 quarters, even those non- 
significant. Between brackets, lagged reactions given by an equation including the significant lags only (see equation 1 in Table 3). 
 * Number of quarters needed to reach 50% (80%) of the long-term effect. 
 
Table 6 
Mean lag of employment to real labour costs (in quarters) 
period of estimation  1970Q1 1996Q4 1970Q1 2002Q2 1985Q1 1996Q4  1985Q1 2002Q2 
50%* lag  4.9  (4.8) 5.1 (5.3) ** (**) 3.6 (4.9) 
80%* lag 10.2  (10.1) 8.9 (12.7) ** (**) 5.7 (7.4) 
mean lag  7.7 (7.3) 7.2 (8.6) ** (**) 5.0 (5.2) 
Note: lagged reactions given by an equation including all lags of endogenous and exogenous variables up to 5 quarters, even those non- 
significant. Between brackets, lagged reactions given by an equation including the significant lag only, see equation 1 in Table 3). 
 * Number of quarters needed to reach 50% (80%) of the long-term effects. 
 ** Non interpretable: long term elasticity has a positive sign, which is contrary to the theory. 
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Table 7 
Time series estimates with alternative measures of employment for euro area 
 Full-time equivalents Hours worked(1) 
Estimation period 1983Q4-2002Q1 1981Q3-2001Q4 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
] lnEt-1 0.564  
(7.26) 
0.530  
(4.33) 
] lnYt-2 0.105  
(2.73) 
0.072  
(1.53) 
] ln Y t-3 0.061  
(1.74) 
 
] ln (w/p) t-2 -0.067  
(-1.65) 
 
] ln (w/p) t-5 -0.071  
(-2.01) 
Error correction 
mechanisms 
-0.033  
(-1.37) 
-0.0719 
(-2.77) 
ln (w/p) t-1 
(long-term relationship) 
-0.320 -0.148 
Time trend (-1) 
(long-term relationship) 
-0.0037 -0.005 
Intercept 
(long-term relationship) 
-2.964 3.489 
Dummy 1984Q1 -0.0051  
(-3.51) 
-0.0035 
(-7.58) 
Dummy 1992Q3 -0.0049  
(-3.16) 
-0.005 
 (-9.87) 
Intercept -0.00019  
(-0.52) 
0.516 
 (2.76) 
Break  (1997Q1-2002Q2) 0.00083 
 (2.01) 
0.00155  
(2.69) 
Main statistics   
R2 0.796 0.717 
Adjusted R2 0.770 0.690 
Diagnostic tests(2) 
Durbin Watson 2.04 2.04 
LM (1) 0.08  
(0.77) 
0.09  
(0.77) 
LM (4) 7.73  
(0.10) 
3.46  
(0.48) 
ARCH(1) 0.35  
(0.55) 
8.64  
(0.003) 
WHITE 18.75 
 (0.13) 
27.77 
 (0.004) 
Normality 2.32 
 (0.31) 
20.03 
 (0.0005) 
RESET(1) 0.58 
 (0.45) 
0.49 
 (0.48) 
CHOW(3) 9.22 
 (0.82) 
9.08 
 (0.77) 
(1) As some heteroskedasticity has been detected., the t-statistics presented in this column are computed with the White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Euro area data on total hours worked are coming from Korteweg and Vijselaar (2002). 
(2) Asymptotic tests are presented, as the hypothesis of normal residuals is not always fulfilled (e.g. equation in hours worked). 
(3) Predictive failure test over the period 1999-2001 
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Table 8 
Testing a break in employment equation from 1997 with a panel of 21 OECD countries, 1977-2001 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP growth 0.568 0.567 0.563 0.565 
(15.09) (15.05) (14.98) (15.03) 
GDP growth (-1) 0.233 0.233 0.232 0.232 
(5.62) (5.63) (5.60) (5.61) 
GDP growth (-2) 0.114 0.112 0.110 0.110 
(2.98) (2.94) (2.87) (2.89) 
Real labour cost  -0.252 -0.252 -0.249 -0.249 
(-9.24) (-9.27) (-9.13) (-9.15) 
Real labour cost (-1) -0.036 -0.036 -0.032 -0.032 
(-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.17) (-1.17) 
Break in euro area countries 0.304    
(1.24)    
Break in countries outside euro area 0.048   0.047 
(0.19)   (0.19) 
Break in EU countries    0.320   
(1.48)   
Break in Non-EU   -0.088 -0.090  
(-0.30) (-0.30)  
Break in EU countries with faster employment growth from 1997    0.745  
(2.25)  
Break in EU countries with unchanged employment growth from 1997    0.018  
(0.06)  
Break in euro area countries with faster employment growth from 1997     0.741 
(2.24) 
Break in euro area countries with unchanged employment growth from 1997 -0.194 
(-0.55) 
Number of observations 523 523 523 523 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
R squared 0.504 0.504 0.506 0.509 
Poolability of euro area countries  ^²(5)=24.11 _²(5)=24.29 _²(5)=23.94 _²(5)=25.00 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
Data sources: OECD, economic outlook. Author’s calculations. 
Note: The equations are estimated by fixed-effects (within) regression. GDP and w/p have been instrumented in order to overcome endogeneity 
problems. The list of instruments is the contemporaneous export of goods and services and real labour costs lagged by two quarters. Euro area 
countries with faster employment growth from 1997 onwards are Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Netherlands. Euro area countries 
with unchanged employment growth from 1997 are Austria, Germany, Greece, Finland and Portugal. EU countries with faster employment 
growth from 1997 onwards are Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Netherlands. EU countries with unchanged employment growth from 
1997 are Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, and Portugal, Sweden and the UK. These groups were constituted on the basis of the 
sign and significance of country break in preliminary regressions shown in Table 9. The poolability of restriction between the euro area 
countries and the other OECD countries is rejected by the Chow test on common slopes. This might generate a bias in parameter estimates, 
although the estimation may gain in efficiency when pooling. However, we keep pooling all OECD countries, as the purpose of the table is 
primarily to test the significance of the break with different groups of countries. 
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Table 9 
Testing a break in employment equation for each country from 1997 with a panel of 21 OECD countries, 
1977-2001 
Country 
(euro area countries in italics) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Austria 0.533 0.375 0.375 
(1.38) (1.07) (1.07) 
Belgium 0.953 0.753 0.753 
(2.17)** (1.82)* (1.82)* 
Canada 0.676 0.320 0.320 
(0.68) (0.39) (0.39) 
Switzerland -0.236 -0.269 -0.269 
(-0.32) (-0.56) (-0.56) 
Germany -1.006 -0.848 -0.848 
(-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.22) 
Denmark 0.219 -0.099 -0.099 
(0.28) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Spain 3.589 3.264 3.264 
(2.94)*** (3.46)*** (3.46)*** 
Finland 2.009 1.218 1.218 
(1.47) (1.39) (1.39) 
France 1.240 1.189 1.189 
(2.99)*** (3.71)*** (3.71)*** 
United Kingdom 0.851 0.674 0.674 
(0.92) (1.12) (1.12) 
Greece -0.376 -0.891 -0.891 
(-0.33) (-0.97) (-0.97) 
Ireland 2.987 1.554 1.554 
(2.19)** (1.48) (1.48) 
Italy 1.055 1.288 1.288 
(1.88)* (3.34)*** (3.34)*** 
Japan -0.906 -0.469 -0.469 
(-2.47)** (-2.03)** (-2.03)** 
Netherlands 1.460 0.919 0.919 
(2.21)** (2.08)** (2.08)** 
Norway 0.376 0.219 0.219 
(0.50) (0.43) (0.43) 
New Zealand -0.401 -0.319 -0.319 
(-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.31) 
Portugal 1.156 0.906 0.906 
(1.30) (1.35) (1.35) 
Sweden 1.139 1.141 1.141 
(1.11) (1.53) (1.53) 
United States -0.495 -0.829 -0.829 
(-0.62) (-1.25) (-1.25) 
Observations 523 523 523 
Number of countries 21 21 21 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%,; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Note: The break is modelled by a break in the intercept (additional growth). The dependent variable is annual employment growth, while the 
regressors are GDP growth and real compensation per employee. Various lag specifications have been used regressors lagged by 2 years 
(equation 1) so as to avoid endogeneity problems; contemporaneous regressors plus their lagged values by 1 and 2 years (equation 2) as lags of 
3 years and more turn insignificant; lagged regressors by 1 and 2 years (equation 3). The three equations are estimated by generalised least 
squares with country fixed effects, allowing for heteroskedastic errors and common-across-group first order serial correlation. 
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Table 10 
Impact of sectoral composition on total employment growth 
Industrial sectors  Average annual growth rate 
of employment 
Share in total employment Decomposition of employment growth
1997-2001 
1986-1991 1997-2001 1986-1991 1997-2001 Value-added 
growth  
Employment 
intensity 1
Agriculture -3.7 -1.5 7.1 4.5 0.8 -1.8 
Industry excluding construction 0.5 0.2 24.8 20.2 2.3 0.1 
Construction 1.7 0.6 7.3 7.1 0.2 2.6 
Trade, repairs, hotels and restaurant, transport 
and communication
2.0 1.9 24.0 25.1 3.7 0.5 
Financial, real estate renting and business 
services
4.9 4.8 9.8 13.6 3.5 1.4 
Public administration, education, health and 
other services
2.4 1.4 27.0 29.5 1.3 1.0 
Total 1.6 1.5 100 100 2.6 0.6 
Total with the sectoral structure of 1986-
1990. 
1.6 1.3    
Data sources: ESA95 national account, Eurostat. OECD, STAN databases. Author’s calculations.
1 Ratio employment growth / value-added growth. In other words, this is the empirical elasticity of employment to value added. 
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Table 11 
Panel data models of employment including labour market institutions 
Dependent variable: total employment (level in logarithm/employment rate) 
(Euro area countries(1). 1960-1997) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Employment 
(in log) 
employment 
(in log) 
employment 
(in log) 
employment 
(in log) 
employment 
rate (%) 
employment 
rate (%) 
Macroeconomic variables  
Ln (Employment) (-1) 0.862 0.856 0.857 0.788   
(19.55) (18.68) (18.71) (17.52)   
Employment rate (-1)     0.854 0.771 
(31.17) (23.71) 
Ln (GDP) -0.003 0.008 0.009 0.003   
(-0.77) (0.21) (0.23) (0.08)   
Ln (Real compensation per employee) -0.05 -0.045 -0.041 -0.083   
(-1.80) (-1.49) (-1.33) (-2.65)   
Institutions  
Employment protection  -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 0.113 -0.003 0.010 
(-2.16) (-1.93) (-2.06) (3.71) (-0.81) (0.92) 
Total taxes on labour  -0.137 -0.147 -0.147 -0.257 -0.101 -0.161 
(-3.09) (-2.92) (-2.91) (-1.87) (-4.34) (-2.79) 
Unionisation  -0.036 -0.040 -0.035 0.101 -0.005 0.128 
(-1.52) (1.58) (-1.34) (0.91) (0.42) (2.92) 
Bargaining coordination  0.007 -0.024 0.079 0.003 0.027 
(1.85) (-0.60) (3.28) (1.61) (2.85) 
Bargaining coordination squared   0.007    
(U-shape curve hypothesis)   (0.78)    
Unemployment benefits replacement ratio  0.005 0.008 0.112 -0.024 0.014 
(0.19) (0.28) (1.32) (-2.06) (0.37) 
Unemployment benefits duration  0.003 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.023 
(0.35) (0.48) (0.25) (0.33) (2.38) 
Interactions between institutions  
Employment protection* Total taxes on labour    -0.034  0.051 
(-0.47)  (1.96) 
Employment protection* Bargaining coordination    -0.050  -0.003 
(-4.72)  (-0.82) 
Employment protection* Unionisation    0.063  -0.025 
(1.85)  (-1.68) 
Employment protection* Unemployment benefits duration    -0.001  -0.021 
(-0.05)  (-2.40) 
Employment protection* Unemployment benefits replacement ratio    -0.053  -0.005 
(-0.96)  (-0.24) 
Total taxes on labour* Unionisation    -0.087  -0.044 
(-2.66)  (-3.43) 
Total taxes on labour* Bargaining coordination    0.074  -0.009 
(2.20)  (-0.56) 
Unemployment benefits replacement ratio* Unemployment benefits duration    -0.026  -0.014 
(-0.50)  (-0.54) 
Intercept  2.379 2.268 2.242 3.393 0.149 0.153 
(3.70) (3.41) (3.38) (5.18) (5.30) (4.90) 
Country specific trends No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 289 289 289 289 330 330 
Number of countries 9 9 9 9 10 10 
Cointegration  (Stationarity of residuals - Maddala-Wu test) _²(18)= 68.82 _²(18)= 68.43 _²(18)= 73.54 _²(18)= 73.53 _²(20)= 59.5 _²(20)= 60.8 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Poolability of euro area countries (2) ^²(6)=112.9 _²(9)=114.8 _²(10)=110.81 _²(17)=99.5 _²(7)= 159.8 _²(15)=116.3 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sources: OECD economic outlook, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). Author’s calculations. 
(1) Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. Portugal is included in equation (5) 
and (6), 
(2) Chow test on common slopes between the euro area and other OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, 
US, Denmark and New Zealand).  
Note: The equations are estimated by generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors and common-across-group first order serial 
correlation. Each equation contains country dummies and time dummies (fixed effects). Nickell (1981) shows that the bias of dynamic (with 
lagged dependent variable among the regressors) fixed effects models with first order serial correlation is o(1/T) and therefore becomes less 
important as T grows. Moreover, Judson and Owen (1999) showed that the fixed effect estimator performs as well as many alternatives when 
T=30 (see Nunziata, 2001). Employment, GDP and real labour cost are included with a lag of two years to tackle endogeneity problems (reverse 
causality). The panel is unbalanced as some data are missing for the 1960s and 1970s.  
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Table 12 
Panel data models of employment including active labour market policies 
Dependent variable: total employment (level in logarithm/employment rate) 
(Unbalanced euro country panel (1), 1988-2001) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Employment (in 
log) 
employment (in 
log) 
employment (in 
log) 
employment rate 
(%) 
Ln (Employment) (-1)     0.904 
(17.19) 
Employment rate (-1) 0.873 0.865 0.877  
(12.84) (11.58) (11.35)  
Ln (GDP) (-2)  0.068 0.090 0.073  
(0.82) (0.97) (0.70)  
Ln (Real compensation per employee) (-2) -0.050 -0.038 -0.011  
(-0.83) (-0.48) (-0.13)  
Public employment services (-2) -0.022 -0.059 -0.058 0.009 
(-0.37) (-0.84) (-0.76) (0.29) 
Labour market training (-2) (2) -0.049 -0.055 -0.053 -0.021 
(-1.77) (-1.83) (-1.56) (-1.91) 
Tobal subsidised employment (-2) (a+b) 0.010    
(0.78)    
Subsidies to regular employment in the private sector (-2) (a) 0.031 0.026 0.020 
(1.10) (0.69) (1.76) 
Direct job creation (public or non-profit) (-2) (b) 0.009 0.010 0.000 
(0.50) (0.44) (0.01) 
Youth measures (-2) (3) -0.026  
(-0.47)  
Constant 0.779 0.381 0.402 0.067 
(0.73) (0.31) (0.27) (1.63) 
Country specific trends No No No Yes 
Number of observations 138 125 117 134 
Number of countries 10 10 10 10 
Cointegration  (Stationarity of residuals - Maddala-Wu test) _²(18)= 33.9 _²(18)= 48.14 _²(18)= 51.8 _²(20)= 23.6 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.259) 
Poolability of euro area countries (4) _²(6)= 5.33 _²(7)= 5.48 _²(8)= 13.14 _²(7)= 68.2 
(0.502) (0.602) (0.107) (0.000) 
Data sources: OECD economic outlook. Active labour market policies (ALMP) data stems from the OECD database on labour market 
programmes. Author’s calculations. 
(1) Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. 
(2) Training for employed and unemployed adults and those at risk 
(3) Measures for unemployed and disadvantaged youth and support of apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training 
(4) Chow test on common slopes between the euro area countries and other OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, US, Denmark and New Zealand).  
Note: The equations are estimated by generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors and common-across-group first order serial 
correlation. Each equation contains country dummies and time dummies (fixed effects). Nickell (1981) shows that the bias of dynamic (with 
lagged dependent variable among the regressors) fixed effects models with first order serial correlation is o(1/T) and therefore becomes less 
important as T grows. Moreover, Judson and Owen (1999) showed that the fixed effect estimator performs as well as many alternatives when 
T=30 (see Nunziata, 2001). Employment, GDP and real labour cost are included with a lag of two years to tackle endogeneity problems (reverse 
causality). In order to take into account that active labour market measures are likely to impact employment gradually and to correct for possible 
endogeneity, ALMP (expressed as the share of ALMP expenditures in GDP) are estimated with a two year lag. The panel is unbalanced as some 
data are missing for the 19960s and 1970s. 
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Figure 6a
Relation between break in employment pattern and changes in employment structure 
Change in the sectoral composition of employment from the late 1980s 
y = 4.23x - 0.073
R 2 = 0.170
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Data sources: New Cronos, Eurostat. The break in employment growth since 1997 corresponds to the panel estimation (model 1) reported in 
Table 9. Non significant breaks are set at zero. 
Figure 6b
Relation between break in employment pattern and changes in institutions  
Labour tax rate
y = -0.3052x + 0.972
R2 = 0.4816
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Figure 6b (continued) 
Relation between break in employment pattern and changes in institutions 
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Data sources: OECD. Nickell and Nunziata (2001), Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2002). Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat). The break in 
employment growth since 1997 corresponds to the panel estimation (model 1) reported in Table 9. The results for bargaining co-ordinations are 
not displayed given the absence of any significant changes in most countries in the late 1990s. 
Figure 6c
Relation between break in employment pattern and changes in active labour market policies 
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Data sources: OECD. The break in employment growth since 1997 corresponds to the panel estimation (model 1) reported in Table 9. 
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ANNEX  
Detailed results of the estimation of a standard employment equation for the euro area. (Addendum 
to section 2.3) 
The two-step estimation without break, called equation 1 in the rest of the text and reported in column 1 
of Table 3, yields similar results to the one-step estimation (column 2 of Table 3). The residuals are 
normal and there is no serial correlation. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected by 
Ljung-Box Q test. This is confirmed by the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test (with one and four 
lags) at 5%. Heteroskedasticity is rejected with the White test _²(13) at 1%. The equation estimation 
results from a “general-to-specific” approach. The chosen length of the lag distribution, i.e. 5, is that 
associated with the lowest value of both the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Criterion. The 
existence of the cointegration relation, captured by the ECM term, is established according to two 
methods. First, we check that the residual of the long-run relationship is stationary with both Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests. We use the asymptotic critical values tabulated by Phillips and 
Ouliaris, which should be applied to residuals from spurious cointegrating regressions (Hamilton, 1994). 
Second, we use the Johansen Test based on the estimation of a VECM. Both trace statistic and maximum 
eigen value statistics confirm the existence of a cointegration relationship between GDP, real labour cost 
and employment.  
The equation contains time dummies, encompassing specific time effects. Even though the choice of 
dummies and that of the specific quarters are somewhat arbitrary, their inclusion increases substantially 
the fit of the equation, while having an economic meaning. The first dummy (1975Q2) may partly capture 
adverse effects of the first oil shock in the mid-1970s, such as the deterioration in employers’ confidence 
and the rise in economic uncertainty. The second dummy (1984Q1) might refer to the negative impact on 
employers’ expectation of the tightening fiscal and monetary policy in France, implemented after the 
short-lived and unsuccessful expansionary macroeconomic policy conducted in 1981-1982. The third 
(1992Q3) is related to the strong and temporary increase in value added in the German building sector, 
caused by public subsidies in the context of German Reunification. Those few quarterly dummies only 
capture part of those effects, but correct for the strongest outliers. Conversely, dummies capturing 
asymmetry of labour demand across the economic cycle (e.g. negative dummy when the level of GDP is 
decreasing over four quarters) turn out not to be significant.  
Equation 1 allows us to determine the impact of the traditional determinants on employment growth. The 
long-term elasticity of real labour costs is 0.44 over the period 1971Q3-2002Q2 and 0.34 when estimated 
over 1971Q3-1996Q4. As a robustness check, we obtained a broadly similar elasticity, 0.55 and 0.40 for 
the two periods mentioned earlier, when estimating equation (1) in one step, allowing for joint estimation 
of the long-run effects with dynamic effects. A Cobb-Douglas specification has been tested and clearly 
rejected. In such a frame, the long-term elasticity of employment to real labour costs is (minus) unity and 
there is no time trend. First, the error correction mechanism, which is equal to the logarithm of real unit 
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labour costs with a Cobb-Douglas production function26, turns out to be clearly non stationary with the 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillip-Perron unit root tests. Moreover, a simple panel data estimate of labour demand 
indicates that the long-term elasticity27 of employment to real labour costs is -0.35 and constraining it to -
1 is largely rejected by a Wald test (see Table 13 below). The long-term elasticity of employment to GDP 
is estimated to be 0.97 and constraining it to unity is largely accepted. All in all, the results of the euro 
area equation are confirmed using a panel data approach. 
Table 13 
Panel data estimates of employment in euro area countries 
Dependent variable: annual employment growth 
Explanatory variables expressed in annual growth 
(12 euro area countries. 1977-2001) 
employment (1) (2) 
emp (-1)  0.03 
(0.04) 
gdp 0.78 
(11.06) 
0.78 
(11.1) 
gdp (-1) 0.16 
(1.93) 
0.15 
(1.80) 
gdp (-2) 0.03 
(0.39) 
0.03 
(0.53) 
w/p -0.35 
(-8.3) 
-0.35 
(-8.34) 
w/p(-1) -0.04 
(-0.87) 
-0.03 
(-0.07) 
intercept -1.86 
(-2.7) 
-0.05 
(-2.00) 
Observations 262 262 
R-squared (within) 0.62  
R-squared (between) 0.43  
R-squared (overall) 0.59  
Unit long-term GDP elasticity:  
c(gdp)+c(gdp/p(-1)+ c(gdp/p(-2))=1  
_²(1)= 0.08 _²(1)= 0.08 
Long-term real labour cost elasticity constrained to 
minus unity: c(w/p)+c(w/p(-1))=-1  
^²(1)= 577.6 _²(1)= 514.85 
Arellano-Bond test on autocorrelation of order 2  N(0,1)=0.37 
Sagan test  _²(426)=231.02 
Global significance _²(31)= 326.18 _²(31)= 419.6 
Sources: OECD economic outlook. Author’s calculation.  
Note: Equation (1) is estimated by fixed-effects (within) regression and contains time dummies. As a robustness check, equation (2) is estimated 
with variables in first difference by instrumental variables using the dynamic panel estimator package (DPD) developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), which derives a Generalised Method of Moments estimator. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which follows a chi-squared 
with 426 degrees of freedom, is clearly accepted with a p-value of 0.99. This means that the instruments (in excess of the regressors) are valid. 
The R squared is not reported for equation (2) as it is not comparable to that of equation (1) given equation (2) refers to first-differences. 
Equations (1) and (2) contain time dummies. For equations 1 and 2, GDP and w/p have been instrumented in order to overcome endogeneity 
problems. The list of instruments is the contemporaneous export of goods and services and contemporaneous investments. As the explanatory 
variables are expressed in annual growth rates, the time trend becomes an intercept. The panel is unbalanced (data for Luxembourg and 
Portugal are available from the early 1990s only). Regressions start in 1977, as some variables, especially the instruments, are not available 
before for many countries. 
26 The error correction mechanism may be rewritten as: ECM=lnE –lnY +ln(w/p)=ln((w/p)/(Y/E))=ln(ULC/p), where ULC 
means nominal unit labour costs.
27 The long-term elasticity is the sum of the contemporaneous elasticity and that of all significant lags. 
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Concerning the stability of the equation, evidence is mixed. The coefficients appear very stable up to 
1997 but vary henceforth. The Chow forecast test with diverse break points does not allow for rejecting 
the hypothesis of stability. The CUSUM test (Brown, Durbin, and Evans, 1975), based on the cumulative 
sum of the recursive residuals, confirms that the equation is broadly stable over the estimation period. As 
shown by Figure 1, dynamic simulations from equation (1) estimated over 1971Q3-1996Q4 appear 
satisfactory in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990, but underestimate the magnitude in employment variation 
in the late 1990s. Conversely, the dynamic simulation obtained from equation (1) estimated over the full 
period is fairly mediocre, especially from 1991, which might signal some instability at the end of the 
period, as confirmed by the recursive estimates of the coefficient. 
The equation appears unstable at the end of the estimation period. The recursive estimates of the 
coefficients are very stable up to 1997 but vary henceforth. As shown by Figure 1, dynamic simulations 
from equation (1) of Table 3 estimated over 1971Q3-1996Q4 appear satisfactory in the 1970s, 1980s and 
early 1990, but underestimate the magnitude in employment variation in the late 1990s. Conversely, the 
dynamic simulation obtained from equation (1) estimated over the full period is fairly mediocre, 
especially from 1991, which seems to confirm the instability at the end of the period. 
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